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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH
SANDRA BEYNON,
Case No. 91-0551

Plaintiff/Appellant
vs.
ST. GEORGE - DIXIE LODGE
# 1743, BENEVOLENT &
PROTECTIVE ORDER OP ELKS,
Defendant/Appellee

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY
THE HONORABLE PHILIP EVES, JUDGE PRESIDING
Trial Court Case No. 90-050-3229

Plaintiff\Appellant, SANDRA BEYNON, by and through her
counsel of record John Pace and Brian M. Barnard of the Utah
Legal Clinic on behalf of the Utah Civil Rights and
Liberties Foundation, Inc., submits the following REPLY
BRIEF in further support of her appeal.

1

STATEMENT OP PACTS
In its version of the facts of this case, defendant\
appellee, St, George-Dixie Lodge #1743, Benevolent and
Protective Order of Elks (hereinafter the "Lodge" or "Elks
Lodge"), lists several "supplemental" facts allegedly
admitted by Ms. Beynon for the purposes of defendant's
motion for summary judgment.

The Lodge's insistence that

these facts are now undisputed is misleading.

Although Ms.

Beynon admitted certain facts in response to defendant's
motion for summary judgment, these acknow-ledgments were
made in conjunction with Ms. Beynon's own factual
statements, many of which contradicted, modified and/or
augmented her "admissions".

Plaintiff's Response to

Defendant's Motion for SSummary Judgment ("Plaintiff's
Response Memorandum") at 2-9; T.R. 1116.1
For example, while Ms. Beynon conceded that the Lodge
has selective membership criteria and is not open to the
general public, (Appellee's Brief at 42), at the same time,
she established from members' testimony that the Lodge is
not genuinely particular in applying its standards and
1

Importantly, the trial court judge did not refer to
these additional details in his statement of the undisputed
facts pertinent to the resolution of this case. Hearing
Transcript at 36-37, T.R. 1254; Memorandum Decision at
unnumbered p. 2-3, T.R. 1196. In addition, at the summary
judgment hearing, plaintiff's counsel did not stipulate to
any specific facts, although he did agree that facts
enumerated by the judge were crucial.
2

admits all, or nearly all, males who request membership.
Plaintiff's Response Memorandum at 4, T.R. at 1118 ("The
plaintiff denies the conclusory statement that Athe Lodge is
very selective as to those whom it admits as members.' The
degree of selectivity may be a question to be determined by
this Court.")•

Ms. Beynon also agreed that the Lodge is

incorporated as a non-profit enterprise, but she did so
while attesting to the obvious commercial nature of the
Elks' operation.
6-13.

Id. at 5, T.R. 1120; Appellant's Brief at

Though Ms. Beynon agrees that the Elks Lodge is not

open to the public to the extent that any member of the
general public can walk in off the street, Ms. Beynon has
consistently demonstrated the Elks maintain sufficient
openness and contact with the public to require application
of the Utah Civil Rights Act to its discriminatory conduct.
Id.
Additionally, Ms. Beynon agrees that Elks Lodge
regulations specify that the "Lodge members cannot use their
membership to further business pursuits."

Appellee's Brief

at 43. However, Ms. Beynon produced members' testimony
confirming that despite this rule, business matters are
discussed and business contacts made at the Lodge and during
Elks Lodge events.

Appellant's Brief at 12.

In addition,

members play host for business meetings and company training
events.

Id.

Finally, while the Lodge insists that its
3

"central" activity is the Tuesday night meeting closed to
women, the appellee itself touts its extensive involvement
in the community as a charitable organization and as a
vehicle for encouraging patriotism and community
responsibility as other fundamental purposes of its
organization.

Appellee's Brief at 47-48.

Thus, although Ms. Beynon conceded certain facts
concerning the nature of the Lodge, these admissions were
made along with Ms. Beynon's assertions and proof that the
Lodge is public enough and commercial enough to be subject
to Utah's anti-discrimination statute.

More importantly,

potentially unspecified admissions should not replace legal
conclusions which go to the core of this dispute.

Warfield

v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club. 262 Cal.Rptr. 890, 893 fn.
4 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1989)(counsel's statements during a
hearing);2 Irwin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 184
Cal.Rptr. 288 (Cal.App. 1982).

Despite conceding that the

Elks Lodge is a non-profit, "private" corporation, Ms.
Beynon is free to contend and has always contended that the
2

In Peninsula Golf, the California Court specifically
refused to consider counsel's "admission" (the Court's
quotations) that defendant was M*truly a private membership
club'" as conclusive of the club's private status for the
purposes of determining whether defendant was a business
establishment under the Unruh Civil Rights Act: "Having
examined the purported admission, we conclude counsel's
statement was at best ambiguous and cannot serve as a
factual substitute for the vigorously contested question of
overarching significance." Id.
4

Lodge is a business for the purposes of the Utah Civil
Rights Act and is insufficiently private to be entitled to
First Amendment immunity from the state's anti-discrimination mandate,

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Lodge's plea to be exempt from the Utah Civil
Rights Act devalues the critical policy interests and
liberal reach of the anti-discrimination statute.

By

guaranteeing individuals full and equal access to all
business establishments and enterprises regulated by the
state, regardless of gender, Utah lawmakers branded gender
discrimination as particularly threatening to the health and
welfare of the state's citizens.

This directive is to spare

individuals the affront and humiliation brought on by gender
discrimination.

In addition, the uncompromising language of

the civil rights act mandates that the state —
any other actor —

more so than

be conspicuously removed from those who

practice any invidious discrimination, preventing any
benefits or advantages bestowed by the state from being used
to aid unlawful discrimination.
Accordingly, to further Utah's compelling interest in
eradicating invidious discrimination in business establishments and businesses licensed by the state to sell beer and
alcohol, the Lodge's discriminatory conduct must cease.
5

Indeed, case law which has interpreted statutory language
identical to the text of the Utah Civil Rights Act uniformly
confirms that the statute forbids the Lodge's discriminatory
practices.

Further, the Lodge —

engaged in public and

commercial activities and the beneficiary of state beer and
liquor licenses —

has submitted itself to state supervision

and relinquished its right to First Amendment protection
from state regulation.

Utah law prevents the Lodge from

simultaneously engaging in open commercial discrimination
and profiting from special state advantages while claiming
immunity from the reach of state law.

ARGUMENT
A. The Elks Lodge is Business Regulated by the State,
Subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act.
All relevant considerations conclusively establish that
the Lodge is an enterprise regulated by the state for the
purposes of the Utah Civil Rights Act.
alcohol licenses —

Given its two state

one to sell beer, one to sell liquor

—

the Lodge cannot earnestly deny that it is subject to the
state anti-discrimination law as a business that enjoys
special state benefits.
First, application of fundamental principles of
statutory construction discredit the Lodge's claim.

The

authors of the Utah Civil Rights Act specifically required
6

that the act be "liberally construed with a view to promote
the policy and purposes of the act and to promote justice."
U.C.A. § 13-7-1 (1953 as amended).

Subsequently, lawmakers

amended the act to prohibit sexual discrimination and to
include within the reach of statute enterprises regulated by
the state.

1973 Utah Laws 18 (amendment made for the

express purpose of "[d]efining and extending the application
of the act to enterprises regulated by the state and . . .
to prevent discrimination on the basis of gender").

Never-

theless, the Lodge would have this Court ignore that
straightforward legislative intent which expanded the scope
of the anti-discrimination statute.

Unless a broad meaning

is attached to the phrase "business which sell beer," the
amendment would add nothing to the Act which already
prohibited discrimination in all business establishments.
The Lodge would have the meaning of the word "business" in
the provision concerning "business establishments" and in
the provision "business which sell beer" be identical.
example,

Appellee's Brief at 13.

For

Such an interpretation

would render the entire provision added in 1973 concerning
state regulated businesses that sell beer and alcohol
superfluous, would frustrate legislative intent, and would
be in violation of the most rudimentary axiom of statutory
construction.

Burks v. Poppy Construction Company, 370 P.2d

313, 316 (Calif. 1962) (declaring in the context of the
7

Unruh Civil Rights Act that "a court must construe
[statutes] so as to give force and effect to all their
provisions11); Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 P.2d
934# 936 (Utah 1990).3
Second, the Lodge declines to acknowledge the import of
the policy and purposes further by the 1973 amendment to the
Utah Civil Rights Act.

Recognizing the harm and threat to

the health, safety and general welfare of Utah caused by
invidious discrimination, lawmakers determined that all
enterprises subject to certain listed state laws must abide
by this anti-discrimination mandate.

The state did not want

to be associated with, nor lend aid or support to those
persons that practice invidious discrimination.

Lawmakers

determined that when discrimination has the appearance of
state aid, authorization or sanction, it is particular
harmful and damaging.

Such a conclusion is compelled by

3

The Lodge presents an alternative reading of the
statute which would also frustrate legislative intent,
suggesting that the private club exemption under the
definition of "places of public accommodation," U.C.A. § 137-2 (1), somehow applies to the entire act. Appellee's
Brief at 10. Although the Utah legislature has clearly
demonstrated its ability to create and specify exemptions
when it so desires, the Lodge would second guess the
legislative decision not to exempt clubs from the definition
of enterprises regulated by the state. U.C.A. § 13-7-2
(3)(b); Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc.. 707 P.2d
212, 219 (Cal. 1985) (rejecting an almost identical argument
saying "the Legislature knows how to draft such an exception
when it wishes to.").
8

examination of the statute's structure4 and legislative
history.5
Concern as to an appearance of state support or
affiliation with those entities that practice invidious
discrimination is not unique to Utah lawmakers.

Because

federal equal protection provisions prohibit a state from
acting on the basis of unlawful classifications, courts are
vigilant for instances where state involvement in
discrimination is sufficient to violate federal equal
protection.

Although the case at bar is brought under state

law which has no "state action" requirement, it is
enlightening to examine the details of Cornelius v.

4

All the enterprises listed under U.C.A. § 13-7-2(3)
were included because they are subject to regulation under
other specific provisions of state law. Yet, a institution
subject to regulation under the Utah Uniform Commercial
Credit Code could never claim exemption from the civil
rights act because it is not an "institution", nor could an
insurer regulated by the Insurance Code plead exemption
because it is not an "insurer", nor could a "public utility"
regulated by the Public Utilities Act claim that because it
is not really a public utility it can freely discriminate.
In all these cases, simply because governed by the relevant
law, the entity in question is subject to the act.
Accordingly, simply because the Lodge has a license to sell
beer and one to sell liquor, and is thus subject to state
regulation, it must conform to the Utah Civil Rights Act.
5

For discussion of legislative history see Amicus
Brief of the Attorney General in Peters v. Alta Club, Utah
Supreme Court No. 86046, attached as Exhibit "P";
Appellant's Brief at 20-21 (quoting legislative testimony
indicating that lawmakers considered the Alta Club, a nonprofit, private liquor club, to be a place of business that
sells beer and alcohol).
9

Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182
(1974) (an Elks Lodge may be a private club for the purposes
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act) ,6 a case often cited by the
Lodge.

In a federal equal protection challenge, the

Cornelius Court carefully analyzed a claim that the state's
exemption of the Elks Lodge from its business corporation
tax was unconstitutional encouragement of invidious
discrimination.

Although plaintiff's claim was rendered

moot when the Elks Lodge ended its "de jure" discrimination,7 the Court cautioned that "[w]hatever the freedom of
legitimate Elks and Moose lodges to discriminated racially
with respect to membership, if they do they stand to forfeit
state aid, direct or indirect, which amounts to
x

encouragement.'"

Cornelius 382 F. Supp. at 1204. The

Court also warned the Elks Lodge that its "limited immunity"
as a private club under federal law was non-commercial in
6

The Lodge inappropriately cites Cornelius to support
6its claim that it is not a "business establishment."
Appellee's Brief at 16-18. However, the passages of
Cornelius quoted or referred to never mention the term
"business establishment." This is because Cornelius
involves equal protection law and federal civil rights
legislation, neither of which contain reference to the term
"business establishment." Instead, Cornelius discusses
issues such as state action, the definition of "public
accommodation" and the private club exemption from Title II
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
7

The Court specifically kept open the possibility
that if "de facto" discrimination were demonstrated, that
the defendant lodge would be liable. Cornelius, 382 F.
Supp. at 1192.
10

nature and was dependant upon a showing that the club
"function[s] as an extension of members' homes . . . ."

Id,

at 1204-1205.
Although Cornelius was based on federal equal
protection claims and federal public accommodation law, the
case lends support to Ms. Beynon's claims under Utah law.
Importantly, the case associates minimal state involvement - conveyance of tax exempt status —
ment of discrimination.

with state encourage-

Given this reasoning, when Utah

bestows the benefit of licenses to sell beer and alcohol

—

activities which every Utahn knows to be the subject of
extensive state regulation —

upon an entity engaging in

gender discrimination, the State is undoubtedly linking
itself to, if not aiding and encouraging, this discrimination.

Understandably, this is the exact result that Utah

lawmakers determined to avoid with the 1973 amendment to the
state civil rights act.

Indeed, Utah lawmakers determined

that whenever extensive state regulation entangled the state
in the affairs of a monitored enterprise, discrimination
could not be tolerated for fear that this undesirable
conduct would be encouraged by or associated with the
state7s presence and support.
Further, as the Cornelius court cautioned, when a
private association is a business and ceases to be an
extension of members7 living rooms, it loses its immunity
11

from federal regulation.

Because Utah does not allow

homeowners to sell beer <md alcohol from the privacy of
their residences, the state does not recognize an enterprise
licensed to sell alcohol and beer as a protected private
entity.

By applying for and accepting the privilege of

selling spirits, the Lodge relinquished its privacy claim
and properly become the subject of state anti-discrimination
legislation.

B. The Elks Lodge is A Business Establishment Subject to
the Utah Civil Rights Act.
The Lodge seeks to avoid the mandate of the Utah Civil
Rights Act by insisting that it is neither a business that
sells beer and alcohol nor a business establishment.

As set

out above, there is ample evidence, both textual and
contextual, to establish that any holder of ci state business
license to sell beer or liquor is, for that reason alone, an
enterprise regulated by the state for the purposes of the
Utah Civil Rights Act.

However, there is further support

for Ms. Beynon's claims.
itions of "business" —

Examination of relevant defin-

particularly those evoked in the

context of civil rights legislation —

indicates that the

Lodge is a business and therefore is a business
establishment and a business that sells beer and liquor.
Importantly, precedent which confirms this conclusion comes
12

from California courts which have interpreted the term
"business establishments" in the context of their Unruh
Civil Rights Act.8

In contrast, the Lodge attempts to make

its case herein with definitions from sources such as tax
litigation and anti-trust litigation and cites federal and
state civil rights cases that involve interpretation of
language greatly different from that of the Utah statute.
For example, federal public accommodations law prohibits
discrimination only in "places of public accommodation" and
specifically excludes application of the statute to private
clubs.

Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks,

382 F. Supp. 1182 (1974); Moose Lodge #107 v. Irvis. 407
U.S. 163 (1972).

The scope of Oregon civil rights law is

also limited to "places of public accommodation" and does
not extend to bona fide clubs.

ORS 3 0.675; Schwnek v. Boy

Scouts of America, 551 P.2d 465 (1976); Llovds Lions Club v
Int. Association of Lions Clubs. 724 P.2d 887 (Or.App. 1986)
8

The Unruh Act provides in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this
state are free and equal, and no matter what
their sex . . . are entitled to the full and
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges, or services in all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever.

California Civil Code § 51 (West 1982).
N.B: The Utah Act shares both the "all business
establishments" and "whatsoever" language with the Unruh
Act. U.C.A. § 13-7-3 (1953 as amended).
13

(Lions Club subject to Oregon public accommodations act).
While the provisions of the Oregon statute have been
interpreted by the state's Supreme Court to prohibit
discrimination "by business or commercial enterprises which
offer goods or services to the public," Schwenk, 551 P.2d at
468 (emphasis original), this language is not contained in
the text of the statute.

Thus, while not totally

irrelevant, the cases relied upon by the Lodge are less
instructive and are of less precedental value than those
from California Courts who have dealt with a text identical
to that which is before this Court.
Analysis of California civil rights law indicates that
courts in that state have, in response to legislative intent
to widen the reach of the Unruh Act, continually interpret
the term "business establishment" as broadly as reasonably
possible.

Burks v. Poppy Construction Company, 370 P.2d 313

(Cal. 1962) (seller of tract housing a "business establishment") ; O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association, 662
P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983) (condominium asso-ciation, a non-profit
association, a "business establishment"); Isbister v. Boys/
Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985) (Boys'
Club, a private, non-profit corporation, affiliated with the
Boys7 Club of America, a "business establishment"); Curran
v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts, 195 Cal.Rptr. 325
(Cal.App.2 Dist. 1983) (Boy Scouts, a non-profit
14

organization a "business establishment"); Rotary Club of
Duarte v. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary International, 224
Cal.Rptr. 213 (Cal.App.2 Dist. 1986), Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary
International v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (Rotary
Club, a private, non-profit corporation, a "business
establishment); Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club,
262 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Cal.App.l Dist. 1989) (a non-profit,
privately owned and operated, social and recreational club a
"business establishment"). In at least these five
instances, the California Courts included within the meaning
of "business establishments" non-profit corporations.

Id.

In three of these cases, the non-profit corporations were
also private entities, not open to the general public.
Isbister, supra;

Rotary Club, supra,

Peninsula Golf,

supra.

In rejoinder to the Lodge's false contention that Ms. Beynon
can cite no precedent for her claim that appellee is a
"business", she points to the cases cited above —

cases

which directly contradict the Lodge's claim that "[i]n order
to be a xbusiness' an entity must either be open to the
public or operate for profit."

Appellee's Brief at 9.

For example, in Isbister, 707 P.2d at 218, the
California Supreme Court specifically rejected the Boys'
Club argument that "profit-seeking be a sine

qua non for

coverage of the [Unruh] Act" and even held that a noncommercial entity could be subject to the civil rights
15

provision:

"[t]he fact that [the Boys' Club's] purposes and

operations are not strictly commercial does not bar a
conclusion that it is a *business establishment' to which
the Act applies."

Id. at 219 (footnote omitted).9

The

California Court next held that although the Boys' Club was
a private entity, it was indeed a business.

Id. at 216-218.

Because the membership criteria adopted by the Boys' Club
functioned to exclude only girls from its facilities, the
Club's discriminatory membership policies were covered by
the Unruh Act.

See, United States Jaycees v. McClure, 3 05

N.W.2d 764, 768-769 (Minn. 1981); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (local chapters of the Jaycees
held to be "business facilities" for the purpose of the
Minnesota Civil Rights Act although a nonprofit membership
organization); Lloyds Lions Club v. Int. Association of
Lions Clubs, 724 P.2d 887 (Or.App. 1986), petition for
review dismissed, 740 P.2d 182 (Or. 1987) (nonprofit,
private, selective membership club).

9

Interesting, the Isbister Court specifically
rejected the interpretation of "business" which, on the
basis of a definition provided in Burks, supra (business
defined as a "calling, occupation, or trade, engaged in for
the purpose of making a livelihood or gain"), and cited
herein by the Lodge, would limit the reach of the Unruh Act
to profit-making entities. Isbister, 707 P.2d at 218.
16

Finding the Unruh Civil Rights Act violated by the
refusal of the Peninsula Golf and Country Club to issue
family memberships to women, the California Court of Appeals
rejected the argument that the definition of "business
establishment" should be decided on the basis of a
public\private dichotomy:

"The core question whether

defendant is a xbusiness establishment' within the meaning
of the Act does not lend itself to a formula-like solution
under the more traditional public:private classification
scheme,"

Peninsula Golf, 262 Cal.Rptr. at 893.

Although

the Peninsula Club "consistently argued that its membership
is selective and restricted," the Court noted that plaintiff
alleged that the Club's facilities "are open to the public,
at least in the form of guest use and rental."
896.10

]Cd. at

The Court concluded that the "crucially important

issues of degree of exclusivity maintained and the nature of

10

Because Peninsula Golf concerned whether plaintiff
had alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action for
violation of the Unruh Act, the Court was not in a position
to rule on the merits of the case. Id. at 896. The Court
did decide, on the basis of the pleadings, that the Unruh
Act could prohibit the Golf Club's discriminatory membership
practices and remanded for a determination of whether
enforcement of the Act would unduly burden the Club's
associational rights. Id. at 895 (citations omitted) ("the
right to associational privacy is not without qualification
and is subject to a balancing process"). Importantly, the
Court did not consider the selectiveness of the club to
determine that the Club was a business establishment, but
instead reserved these issues for the discussion of intimate
associational rights. Id.
17

the intimate or expressive associational rights involved"
could not be decided on the initial pleadings.

Id.

As these cases demonstrate, the Lodge'& status as a
private, non-profit corporation does not insulate it from
the reach of Utah's civil rights act.

Private, non-profit

clubs have been subject to the reach of state civil rights
legislation, supra,

Title II litigation, 42 U.S.C.A. §

2000a(b)(3), (c)(3); for

example,

United States v. Lansdowne

Swim Club, 713 F.Supp. 735 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (although
membership dependant upon approval of a committee and
various criteria, swim club not a private club exempted
under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(e)), while non-profit, charities
are subject to Title VII which covers only industries
affecting commerce.

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(h); for

example,

Martin v. United Way of Erie County, 829 F.2d 445 (3rd Cir.
1987) (local, non-profit charitable organization).
Given the criteria established by case law and
considerations of legislative purpose and intent, the Lodge
is a business establishment.

First, as argued above, the

Lodge is a regulated enterprise simply because it has state
licenses to sell beer and liquor.

Second, as a non-profit

corporation, the Lodge shares identical powers with a Utah
for-profit business corporation, including those necessary
to "transact its business."
amended); compare

U.C.A. § 16-6-22(10) (1953 as

U.C.A. § 16-10a-302 (1953 as amended)
18

(general powers of business corporations), attached as
exhibit "C" and "D" respectively.

Only the manner in which

the two entities may distribute their profits separate a
non-profit from a for-profit corporation.

Non-profits are

not precluded from making profits, only from distributing
the profits to members or officers.
(1953 as amended).

U.C.A. § 16-6-19 (11)

This structural difference is not

sufficient to insulate non-profit corporations from the
reach of anti-discrimination legislation.

Third, the

Lodge7s relationship with its members and their guests
closely resembles a traditional business relationship
that of proprietor\client —

—

which is common to all eating

and drinking establishments in St. George.

Again, no

aspects of this relationship are particular to the Lodge in
a manner that would justify allowing discrimination at the
Lodge but not at a similar facility down the street.
In addition to being unable to hide behind its nonprofit status, the Lodge cannot avoid the reach of the Utah
Civil Rights Act simply because it is a "private" club.
First, the Lodge has relinquished its private status by
applying for and accepting state licenses to sell beer and
liquor.

Second, relevant civil rights law readily confirms

that although an entity presents itself as private, it
remains a "business establishment" subject to state antidiscrimination law.

Third, even in public accommodations
19

law —

applying civil rights statutes to the more restricted

"places of public accommodation" rather than the broader
"business establishment" —

private organizations and clubs,

such as the Lodge, which may limit access to their
facilities and maintain selective membership criteria, have
been prohibited, again and again, from denying access to
their facilities on discriminatory classifications.

For all

these reasons, the Lodge is subject to Utah's Civil Rights
Act.11

C. The Elks Lodge Cannot Claim Free Association Immunity
From the Utah Civil Rights Act.
Freedom of association is not without qualifications.
Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Rotary Club,
481 U.S. 537 (1987).

Indeed, the United States Supreme

Court has refused to extend constitutional protection to the
associations among members of the Rotary Club and the
Jaycees, both private membership organizations similar to
the Lodge.

Id.

In both cases, the Clubs lacked intimacy

11

The Lodge argues — quite falsely — that if it is
included under the scope of the Utah Civil Rights Act, "even
churches would qualify as xbusiness establishments7 . . . .
givfing] the Attorney General power to regulate churches and
to select their members and their clergy." Appellee's Brief
at 23. The Utah Act specifically states that "[n]othing in
this act shall be construed . . . to deny any religious
organization the right to regulate the operation and
procedures of its establishments." U.C.A. § 13-7-3 (1953 as
amended).
20

sufficient to provide them the privacy protection afforded
to family-like relationships.

As does the Lodge, both Clubs

founded their First Amendment claims on assertions that they
maintained selective membership criteria.

The Supreme Court

twice rejected this defense.
Similarly, the Lodge has failed to demonstrate that the
relationship among its members is sufficiently intimate to
warrant associational protections.

The Lodge cannot avoid

legal constraints on discrimination simply by having
selective membership criteria.

The relevant inquiry focuses

instead upon the smallness, the genuine selectivity and the
seclusion of the Club.

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.

lacks all of these traits.

The Lodge

First, the Lodge has waived its

claims of private association by consenting to the
regulation of the state in return for the right to sell beer
and liquor.
—

Second, because it admits as members almost all

if not all —

selective.

male applicants, the Lodge is not genuinely

Appellant's Brief at 35-37.

Third, the Club is

neither small (more than 6% of Washington County males are
members), nor are its activities cloistered.

Id.

Because

the Lodge is insufficiently private to warrant special
constitutional protection, it cannot distinguish Roberts v.

21

Jaycees or Rotary Club and cannot claim to be uniquely
exempt from anti-discrimination law.12

BRIEF OP ATTORNEY GENERAL
In 1987, when the case of Megan Marie Peters v. ALTA
CLUB, a non-profit Utah corporation. Case No. 86-0406 was
pending before this Court, the then Utah Attorney General,
David L. Wilkinson, as a statutory party under U.C.A. § 7833-11 (1953 as amended) filed a brief dealing with the Utah
Civil Rights Act and its application to the Alta Club.

That

brief is part of the Trial Record in this case, filed on
February 22, 1988 in the predecessor case and incorporated
in to this case.

T.R. p. 1028.

12

Oddly, the Lodge attempts to distinguish Roberts v.
Jaycees, supra.,
from the case at bar, suggesting that only
because the Jaycees were a "place of public ciccommodation"
(not a "business establishment") did the state have a compelling interest in prohibiting the Club/s discriminatory
conduct. Appellee's Brief at 39. Obviously, the state of
Utah has the same compelling interest in regulating the
conduct of a "business establishment" as the state of
Minnesota has in regulating a "place of public accommodation." Only if an entity is sufficiently private, can its
privacy interest outweigh this compelling interest. The
Jaycees and the Lodge both failed to establish a sufficiently intimate association among their members to warrant this
protection.
22

Because that brief is well researched and written and
provides a valuable exposition from the Attorney General as
to the history and application of the Utah Civil Rights Act,
a complete copy of that brief is appended to this brief as
Exhibit "P".

CONCLUSION
Utah's Civil Rights Act finds "nourishing validity" in
Article IV, § 1 of this State's Constitution.

This

provision, an element of Utah's Constitution since
statehood, declares:

"Both male and female citizens of this

State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious
rights and privileges."

Utah Const. Art. IV, § 1.

Coupled

with the explicit mandate of the Utah Civil Rights Act,
"[t]his clear and comprehensive statement in our
foundational law correlates with the purpose that there
shall be no discrimination based on sex."
City, 506 P.2d 809, 809-810 (Utah 1973).

Kopp v. Salt Lake
Indeed, comparing

this constitutional mandate to the freedom of contract, the
Utah Supreme Court insisted that "Art. I, Sec. 1 must
prevail as the more precious right in our basic law.
fundamental rights —

All

including obligation of contract

—

remain, we believe, in peril or unfulfillment when invidious

23

discrimination is permitted by law . . . ."

Beehive Med,

Electronics v. Industrial Commission, 583 P.2d 53, 60 (Utah
1978).
Accordingly, the Lodge cannot be insulated from the
reach of the constitutional and legislative requirement that
individuals and society be free from the affront and
humiliation of gender discrimination.

Justice and fairness

dictate that the Lodge comply with Utah's antidiscrimination mandate while it enjoys the special privilege
of state licenses.

The Lodge is prohibited from

discriminating against Ms. Beynon because of its state
licenses to sell beer and liquor.

Further, because it

exhibits business-like qualities and conducts its affairs
openly, the Lodge is a business establishment for the
purposes of the act.

Finally, by accepting state licenses

to sell beer and alcohol, by not genuinely restricting its
membership and by conducting its business publicly, the
Lodge has waived any right First Amendment protection.
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the ruling
and decision of the trial court, determine that the Utah
Civil Rights Act applies to the Lodge and remand this case
with instructions to the trial court to entei: judgment in

24

favor of Ms. Beynon granting declaratory and injunctive
relief to end the illegal gender discrimination practiced by
the Lodge.
DATED this 25th day of SEPTEMBER, 1992.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant

*-^4$X&/o^* -^f
BRIAN M. BARNARD
JOHN PACE
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EXHIBITS
Utah Code Annotated § 16-6-22 (1953 as amended)

- - "C"

Utah Code Annotated § 16-10a-302 (1953 as amended)

"D"

BRIEF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Statutory Party
Dated April 15, 1987

"P"
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16-6-22. General powersEach nonprofit corporation shall have power:
(1) To have perpetual succession by its corporate name unless a limited
period of duration is stated in its articles of incorporation.
(2) To sue and be sued, complain and defend, in its corporate name.
(3) To have a corporate seal which may be altered at pleasure, and to
use the same by causing, it, or a facsimile thereof, to be impressed or
(4) To purchase, take, receive, lease," take by gift, devise or bequest, or
otherwise acquire, own, hold, improve, use and otherwise deal in and with
real or personal property, or any interest therein, wherever situated.
(5) To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer and
otherwise dispose of all or any part of its property and assets.
(6) To lend money to its employees other than its officers and trustees.
(7) To purchase, take, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire, own,
hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose
of, and otherwise use and deal in and with, shares or other interests in, or
obligations of, other domestic or foreign corporations, whether for profit
or not for profit, associations, partnerships or individuals, or direct or
indirect obligations of the United States, or of any other government,
state, territory, governmental district or municipality or of any instrumentality thereof.
(8) To make contracts and incur liabilities, borrow money at such rates
of interest as the corporation may determine, issue its notes, bonds, and
other obligations, and secure any of its obligations by mortgage or pledge
of all or any of its property, franchises and income.
(9) To lend money for its corporate purposes, invest and reinvest its
funds, and take and hold real and personal property as security for the
payment of funds so loaned or invested.
(10) To conduct its affairs, transact its business, carry on its operations,
and have offices and exercise the powers granted by this act in any state,
territory, district, or possession of the United States, or in any foreign
country.
(11) To elect or appoint officers and agents of the corporation, and
define their duties and fix their compensation.
(12) To make and alter bylaws, or resolutions, not inconsistent with its
articles of incorporation or with the laws of this state, for the administration and regulation of the affairs of the corporation.
(13) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, to make
donations for the public welfare or for religious, charitable, scientific or
educational purposes; and in time of war to make donations in aid of war
activities.
(14) To indemnify any trustee or officer or former trustee or officer of
the corporation, or any person who may have served at its request as a
trustee, director or officer of another corporation, whether for profit or not
for profit, against expenses actually and necessarily incurred by him in
connection with the defense of any action, suit or proceeding in which he
is made a party by reason of being or having been such trustee, director or
officer, except in relation to matters as to which he shall be adjudged in
such action, suit or proceeding to be liable for negligence or misconduct in
the performance of duty; but such indemnification shall not be deemed
exclusive of any other rights to which such trustee, director or officer may
be entitled, under any bylaw, agreement, vote of the governing board or
members or otherwise.

16-10a-302. General powers.
Unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise, and except as restricted by the Utah Constitution, every corporation has perpetual duration
and succession in its corporate name and has the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its permitted business
purposes, activities, and affairs, including without limitation the power:
. (1) to sue and be sued, complain and defend in its corporate name;
(2) to have a corporate seal, which may be altered at will, and to use it,
or a facsimile of it, by impressing or affixing it or in any other manner
reproducing.it;
(3) to make and amend bylaws, not inconsistent with its articles of
incorporation or with the laws of this state, for managing the business
and regulating the affairs of the corporation;
(4) to purchase, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, and own, hold,
improve, use, and otherwise deal with, real or personal property, or any
legal or equitable interest in property, wherever located;
(5) to sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, and otherwise
dispose of all or-any part of its property and assets;
(6) to purchase, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire, own, hold,
vote, use, sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose of, and deal in
and with shares or other interests in, or obligations of, any other entity;
(7) to make contracts and guarantees, incur liabilities, borrow money,
issue its notes, bonds, and other obligations that may or may not be
convertible into or include the option to purchase other securities of the
corporation, and secure any of its obligations by mortgage or pledge of
any of its property, assets, franchises, or income;
(8) to lend money, invest and reinvest its funds, and receive and hold
real and personal property as security for repayment;
(9) to be a promoter, partner, member, associate, or manager of any
partnership, joint venture, trust, or other entity;
• (10) to conduct its business, locate offices, and exercise the powers
granted by this chapter within or without this state;
(11) to elect directors and appoint officers, employees, and agents of the
corporation, define their duties, fix their compensation, and lend them
money and credit;
(12) to pay pensions and establish pension plans, pension trusts, profit
sharing plans, share bonus plans, share option plans, and benefit or incentive plans for any or all of its current or former directors, officers,
employees, and agents;
(13) to make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes;
(14) to transact any lawful business that will aid governmental policy;
(15) to make payments or donations, or do any other act, not inconsistent with law, that furthers the business and affairs of the corporation;
and
(16) to establish rules governing the conduct of the business and affairs
of the corporation in the event of an emergency.
History: C. 1953, 16-10a-302, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 33.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 277,
§ 249 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.

Cross-References. — Constitutional provisions relating to corporations, Utah Const.,
Art. XII.

(15) To voluntarily dissolve 2ind distribute its assets in accordance with
the provisions of this act.
(16) To have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to effect
any or all of the purposes for which the corporation is organized, including the right to raise funds by such means or methods as the governing
board may deem advisable, not inconsistent with*law or its articles-of
incorporation or bylaws.
History: L. 1963, chu 17, § 5.
Meaning of "this act." — See the note under the same catchline following § 16-6-20.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MEGAN MARIE PETERS,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
vs.

:

ALTA CLUB, a non-profit Utah
corporation,

:
:

BRIEF OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY
GENERAL
No. 860406

Defendant-Appellant. :
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Is the Alta Club subject to the Utah Civil
Rights Act as an "enterprise regulated by the
State?"

II.

Does enforcement of the Utah Civil Rights Act
against the Alta Club violate its members' right
of free association as guaranteed by the United
States and Utah Constitutions?

III.

Is the term "all places of business which sell
beer to consumers" unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad?
STATUTES REQUIRING CONSTRUCTION

The following provisions of the Utah Civil Rights Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 to -4 (1986) are at issue:
13-7-1.

Policy and purposes of act.

It is hereby declared that the practice
of discrimination on the basis of race,
color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national
origin in business establishments or places
of public accommodation or in enterprises
regulated by the state endangers the health,
safety, and general welfare of this state and
its inhabitants; and that such discrimination
in business establishments or places of
public accommodation or in enterprises
regulated by the state, violates the public
policy of the state. It is the purpose of
this act to assure all citizens full and
equal availability of all goods, services and
facilities offered by business establishments
and places of public accommodation and

enterprises regulated by the state without
discrimination because of race, color, sexr
religion, ancestry or national origin. The
rules of common law that statues in
derogation thereof shall be strictly
construed has no application to this act.
This act shall be liberally construed with a
view to promote the policy and purposes of
the act and to promote justice. The remedies
provided herein shall not be exclusive but
shall be in addition to any other remedies
available at law or equity.
13-7-2.

Definitions.

(a) The term "place of public
accommodation11 includes every place,
establishment, or facility of whatever kind,
nature, or class that caters or offers its
services, facilities, or goods to the general
public for a fee or charge, except, any
establishment located within a building which
contains not more than five rooms for rent or
hire and which is actually occupied by the
proprietor of such establishment as his
residence; provided that any place,
establishment, or facility that caters or
offers its services, facilities, or goods to
the general public gratuitously shall be
within the definition of this term if it
receives any substantial governmental subsidy
or support; but the term shall not apply to
any institution, church, any apartment house,
club, or place of accommodation which is in
its nature distinctly private except to the
extent that it is open to the public.
(b) The term "person" includes one or
more individuals, partnerships, associations,
organizations, corporations, labor unions,
legal representatives, trustees, trustees in
bankruptcy, receivers, and other organized
groups of persons.
(c) "Enterprises regulated by the state"
means:
(1) all institutions subject to
regulation under the Utah Uniform Commercial
Credit Code, Title 70B;
(2) all places of business which
sell beer to consumers or house a state
liquor store, as permitted by the Liquor
Control Act, Title 32;
(3) all insurers regulated by the
Insurance Code, Title 31A;
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(4) all public utilities subject to
regulation under the Public Utilities Act,
Title 54.
13-7-3. Equal right in business establishments, places of public accommodation, and
enterprises regulated by the state.
All persons within the jurisdiction of
this state are free and equal and are
entitled to full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, goods and
services in all business establishments and
in all places of public accommodation, and
by all enterprises regulated by the state of
every kind whatsoever, without discrimination
on the basis of race, color, sex, religion,
ancestry or national origin. Nothing in this
act shall be construed to deny any person the
right to regulate the operation of a business
establishment or place of public accommodation or an enterprise regulated by the state
in a manner which applies uniformly to all
persons without regard to race, color, sex,
religion, ancestry, or national origin; or to
deny any religious organization the right to
regulate the operation and procedures of its
establishments.
13-7-4. Business establishment, place of
public accommodation, or enterprise regulated
by the state denying rights deemed public
nuisance - Investigation and conciliation Action to enjoin - Civil action for damages Expenses of defending action.
Any business establishment or place of
public accommodation or enterprise regulated
by the state in which a violation of the
rights provided in § 13-7-3 of this act
occurs is a public nuisance. The operator of
any such business establishment or place of
public accommodation or enterprise regulated
by the state shall be deemed guilty of
maintaining a public nuisance and may be
enjoined as hereinafter provided.
(a) Upon application to the attorney
general by any person denied the rights
guaranteed by S 13-7-3, the attorney general
shall investigate and seek to conciliate the
matter.
(b) An action to enjoin any nuisance
defined in this section may be brought in the
name of the state of Utah by the attorney
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general. Upon the trial of the cause, on
finding that the material allegations of the
complaint are true, the court shall order
such nuisance to be abated, and enjoin all
persons from maintaining or permitting such
nuisance.
When any injunction as herein
provided has been granted it shall be binding
upon the defendant and shall act as an
injunction in personam against the defendant
throughout the state.
(c) Any person who is denied the rights
provided for in § 13-7-3 shall have a civil
action for damages and any other remedy
available in law or equity against any person
who denies him the rights provided for in §
13-7-3 or who aids, incites or conspires to
bring about such denial.
(d) Any business establishment or place
of public accommodation or enterprises
regulated by the state charged with
maintaining a public nuisance in violation of
this act, which is determined or found not to
be in violation of this act, may be awarded
all actual and necessary expenses incurred in
defending such action, as determined and
approved by the court having jurisdiction of
the matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent Peters filed suit in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County charging appellant Alta Club
with sexual discrimination in violation of her civil rights based
upon the Club's refusal to tender her a membership application.
Judgment was entered against Alta Club to the effect that the
Alta Club must issue to Peters a membership application and
reasonably and diligently consider her application; or
alternatively, stop the sale of beer on the premises.
Alta Club appeals from the Judgment entered June 16,
1986 in this case.

Peters cross-appeals from an Order entered

February 14, 1986, denying her motion for summary judgment
pursuant to the Memorandum Decision entered February 4, 1986.
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The Attorney General appears in this Court to support
the constitutionality of the Utah Civil Rights Act and appears
essentially in the nature of an amicus curiae to support the
position taken by Peters, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-33-11
(1953), which permits the Attorney General to be heard in any
proceeding in which a state statute is alleged to be invalid.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Attorney General accepts the fact statements
summarized in Appellant's brief and supplemented by
Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Alta Club is an enterprise regulated by the state
and is subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act by virtue of its sale
of beer and liquor to members and their guests.

Utah Legislators

specifically discussed the meaning and application of the term
"enterprises regulated by the state" and concluded that this
phrase would apply to the Alta Club.

Legislative history behind

the new liquor laws reveals that the state liquor store concept
was retained under the new licensing system based upon a Utah
Supreme Court ruling that there was no legal distinction between
a club license and a state liquor store.
Utah Legislators have determined that gender
discrimination endangers the health, safety and welfare of the
state and its inhabitants.

Under principle rules of construction

the Court may take notice of governmental studies revealing that
between 1984 and 1985 forty percent of Utah's female population
were employed in managerial and professional occupations, yet
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earned only sixty percent of male counterpart earnings.

Areas

targeted by governmental studies as barriers to full
participation of women in the work force specifically included
private non-profit organizations and societal beliefs that
discourage career aspirations.
The Alta Club does not operate its organization as an
extension of the home and is not entitled to the constitutional
protections afforded to private social relationships.

The Alta

Club was formed to provide a place and means for conducting
business meetings and women may attend such meetings.
Furthermore, any claim to associtional freedom by Alta Club is
outweighed by Utah's compelling interest in the dignity of her
citizens and the politicalf economic and social gains of an
integrated work force.
Utah lawmakers may act with broad authority in creating
rights of access on behalf of her citizens.* The state has
determined that enterprises regulated by the state must not'
discriminate on the basis of sex and has defined that phrase to
include all places of business which sell beer to consumers.

The

Alta Club describes itself as a place of business in its Articles
of Incorporation and By-Laws.

Thereforef the Alta Club must

comply with the Utah Civil Rights Act, or stop the sale of
alcoholic beverages on its premises.

~6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
SUPPORTS A RULING THAT THE ALTA CLUB
IS "AN ENTERPRISE REGULATED BY THE
STATE."
A.

LEGISLATORS HAVE PROGRESSIVELY
BROADENED THE SCOPE OF THE UTAH
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT.

Recognizing that discrimination is contrary to the best
interest of the community, the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah
Civil Rights Act (hereinafter "Act") in 1965 to prohibit
discriminatory conduct on the basis of race, color, religion,
ancestry, or national origin in business establishments or places
of public accommodation, 1965 Utah Laws 174 (H.B. No. 311,
current version at Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 to -4 (1986)).

Like

many other states, Utah has progessively broadened the scope of
its anti-discrimination law in the years since it was first
enacted with respect to the type of covered facilities and the
entities for whom discrimination is forbidden.
In 1973 the Act was amended for the express purposes of
"Defining and Extending the Application of the Act to Enterprises
Regulated by the State; and Extending the Application of the Act
to Prevent Discrimination on the Basis of Sex."

1973 Utah Laws

18 (current version at Utah Code Ann. S§ 13-7-1 to -4 (1986)).
In construing the phrase "enterprises regulated by the
state," the court may look to statements made by individual
members of the Legislature.

First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank &

Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 259-260 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S.
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1032 (1967; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 342 (1945); 2A
C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Constr. S48.13 (4th Ed. 1984).
Discussion was had during the 1973 senate floor debates
specifically regarding the meaning of the phrase "enterprises
regulated by the state"*
Senator Howe: Mr. President, I was just
calling Representative Urie to see if she
wanted to come over and explain it [H.B. No.
311] -- but, I think it's rather selfexplanatory. The purpose of it is, I think,
to put into our law, a prohibition against
discrimination on account of sex. We already
have it on — that we can't discriminate on
the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin; but it was not discrimination on the basis of sex was not
included, in this written law, which was
passed in 1965. This is the law, the
antidiscrimination law really of 1965. Then
I note also that it includes not only places
of public accommodation but in enterprises
regulated by the state. Now I'm not just
sure, frankly, what that means, "enterprises
regulated by the state," but I suppose that
it would be —
Senate President: It's - the explanation is
on the next page, Senator Howe.
Senator Howe:

Oh.

Senate President: Line 19. [Pause]
about everybody . . .

Just

Senator Howe: That's right. In other words,
it just, applies, prohibits discrimination
generally against women. We're not doing —
discriminating now anyhow so this bill won't
hurt anybody.
Senate President: I'm, I'm not sure about
one thing — can you tell me for sure —
Senator Howe:

About what?

Senate President: I almost hate to mention
it — but, the only place I know of, is the
Alta Club that has a separate entrance for
women —
-8-

[laughter]
Senator Howe: This, this may change that
Discrimination on Basis of Sex:

—

Hearing on H.B. No. 311f 40th

Leg., 1973 Utah Laws 33 (statements of Sen. Warren E. Pugh,
President, and Sen. Richard C. Howe) (App. B). Thus it appears
that Utah Legislators contemplated the entities for whom
discrimination is forbidden and concluded that the Alta Club is
an "enterprise" within the meaning of the Act.
B.

UTAH LIQUOR LAWS SUPPORT A RULING
THAT THE ALTA CLUB IS "AN ENTERPRISE
REGULATED BY THE STATE."

The language of the Utah Civil Rights Act defines
"enterprises regulated by the state" to include:
(1) All institutions subject to regulation
under the Utah Uniform Commercial Credit
Code, Title 70B, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
(2) All places of business which sell beer
to consumers or house a state liquor store,
as permitted by the liquor control act, Title
32, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
(3) All insurers regulated by the insurance
code, Title 31, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
(4) All public utilities subject to
regulation under the public utilities act,
Title 54, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
1973 Utah Laws 18 (current version at Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1
to -4 (1986)).

Title 32, the former Liquor Control Act referred

to in the Utah Civil Rights Act, was repealed on February 25,
1985, and was replaced by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act,
title 32A, Utah Code Ann. (1986). 1985 Utah Laws 175.

On the

same day, the Utah Civil Rights Act was amended with only minor
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changes1 retaining substantially the language introduced in 1973.
At the time the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act was
considered, memorandum attached to the proposed legislation and
sent to the Utah State Legislature from the Utah Liquor Control
Commission, the original author of the bill, stated that, "It]he
commission has endeavored throughout this legislation to
preserve, whenever possible, the substantive provisions of Utah's
present liquor laws • • . [making] substantive change . . . most
cautiously and only where it felt the effectiveness of the law
would be enhanced."

Memorandum No. 1 from Utah Liquor Commission

to Utah State Legislature at 9-10 (App. C)•
One of the changes in the proposed legislation which
was adopted was the elimination of the term "state liquor stores"
in favor of regulating sales outlets under a single license.
at 12.

Id.

The Liquor Commission explained that the state store

concept originated with the purpose of allowing a degree of
contol over businesses, including removal of the state's liquor
outlet where necessary.

Id. at 10.

The Commission noted it had

previously attempted to summarily remove "'its'" state store from
a licensee's premises, but that the Utah Supreme Court had
rejected any legal distinction between the license issued to the
club and the leasing of space within the club, thereby entitling
the club to procedural due process.

Id. at 11 (citing Celebrity

Club, Inc., v. ULCC, 657 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1982)).

1

For that

The 1985 amendment deleted "Utah Code Annotated 1953" from §§
13-7-2, c(l), (2) and 4; and substituted "Title 31A" for "Title
31, Utah Code Annotated 1953" at the end of § 13-7-2(c)(3).
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reason, and for the elimination of administrative burdens, Mn]o
leases are required under [the new liquor laws]."

id. at 12 The

Commission was quick to assure legislators that fundamental
concepts and operations would not change, and "the state has
really not lost any real degree of actual control over the
outlet."

Xd.

In short, the Alta Club continues to be an entity

that "house Is] a state liquor store."

Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-2(c)

(1986) .
During revision of the former liquor laws, no mention
was made that the new Alcoholic Beverage Control Act was intended
to modify the Utah Civil Rights Act to exclude private clubs
which are licensed to sell liquor.

Nor was there any alteration

in the manner in which retail beer sales were to be handled.
Memorandum No. 2 from Utah Liquor Commission to Utah State
Legislature at 15 (App. D ) .
There is no indication that Legislators intended to
narrowly define the phrase "all places of business which sell
beer to consumers."

The language of the Utah Civil Rights Act

supports a broad construction.

Utah Legislators expressly

provided that the Act "shall be liberally construed with a view
to promote the policy and purposes of the act and to promote
justice."

Utah Code Ann. §13-7-1 (1986).

In light of the

liberal interpretation to be given the Act, and the absence of a
clear expression that private clubs licensed to sell liquor are
not to be included as an enterprise regulated by the state, the
statute should be construed to apply to the Alta Club based upon
its retail sale of beer and liquor.
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C.

COMMUNITY CIRCUMSTANCES CHAMPION
APPLICATION OF THE UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS
TO THE ALTA CLUB.

In addition to legislative history, community
circumstances support a ruling that the Alta Club was intended to
be subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act.
abstract propositions.

"[L]aws are not

They are expressions of policy arising

out of specific situations and addressed to the attainment of
particular ends."

Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading

of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 528, 533 (1947).

A principle rule

of construction is that courts may take notice of pertinent
social facts.

Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation, 3A Sutherland

Stat. Constr. 165 (4th Ed. 1986).

According to section 13-7-1

Utah Legislators were concerned that discrimination on the basis
of sex "endanger led] the health, safety, and general welfare of
this state and its inhabitants; and . . . violates . . . public
policy."

Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-1 (1986).

The Act was passed

with the purpose of assuring to "all citizens full and equal
availability of all goods, services and facilities offered by
business establishments and places of public accommodation and
enterprises regulated by the state."

Utah Code Ann. §13-7-1

(1986) (emphasis added) .
An intensive study performed at Governor Matheson's
request less than one year before the last amendment to the Utah
Civil Rights Act revealed:
Institutional structures, founded on
stereotyping, deprive women of achieving
economic independence and deprive the work
place of their potential contribution.

-12-

Governorfs Task Force on Integrating Women Into the Workforce,
Utah Women in Economic Crisis, at 2 (June 1984) (Archives #
P840081)(App. E). The task force targeted several areas for
solutions to the multiple barriers which impede full
participation of women in the work force including the need to:
(1) strengthen social experience in private non-profit
organizations that would facilitate career mobility; (2) increase
public awareness of successful performance; (3) change laws,
policies and practices that directly or indirectly discriminate
against women; (4) strengthen networks in professional
associations and private non-profit organizations; and (4)
eliminate societal beliefs that discourage career aspirations,
id. at 20-23.
Utah lawmakers are legitimately concerned about the
effect of discrimination on the state and its citizens.
Legislative history and circumstances support a construction that
the Alta Club falls within the categories of enterprises
regulated by the Act.

In enacting the Utah Civil Rights Actf

lawmakers have not unlawfully intruded upon the traditional
"hands-off" policy surrounding the private sphere.

They have

merely said that where an enterprise elects to sell alcoholic
beverages, it thereby becomes subject to state regulation, and
must comply with requirements prohibiting discrimination.

The

Alta Club is an "enterprise regulated by the state" as defined in
section 13-7-2 (c)(2) because of the fact that it sells beer and
liquor to its patrons (R. 43, 257).
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POINT II
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
TO ASSOCIATIONAL FREEDOM ARE NOT VIOLATED BY
APPLICATION OF THE UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT TO
THE ALTA CLUB.
A.

THE UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT IS A REASONABLE
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION.

Congress sought to prohibit discriminatory conduct
privately-owned facilities open to the public through passage
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

42 U.S.C.A. §2000a

(West Supp. 1976) (hereinafter "Federal Act").

The state act

requirement that limited federal powers to regulate private
conduct under the fourteenth amendment was circumvented by
Congress on the theory that the Act represented regulation of
interstate commerce.

The Federal Act states in part:

(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages and
accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this'section,
without discrimination or segregation on the
grounds of race, color, religion, or national
origin.

(e) The provisions of this subchapter shall
not apply to a private club or other
establishment not in fact open to the public,
except to the extent that the facilities of
such establishment are made available to the
customers or patrons of an establishment
within the scope of subsection (b) of this
section.
42 U.S.C.A. S2000a (West Supp. 1976).

Although the federal

government did not feel compelled to address gender
discrimination, Congress did not preempt state and local
communities to act on their own initiative.
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains several
provisions which refer expressly to the
powers of the states in the field of civil
rights* Some of these provisions require
federal action to be deferred in favor of
action under any state statute which may be
equally effective in enforcing the policies
which Congress incorporated into the act.
Other provisions define circumstances under
which state or local agencies may be utilized
in cooperation with the federal government to
carry out the functions defined in the act.
Finally the act contains certain provisions
which, rather than grant power to the states,
recognized the residual powers of a state to
enact its own civil rights legislation and
allow full faith and credit to those acts not
inconsistent with the federal legislation.
Comment, State Legislative Response to the Federal Civil Rights
Act, 9 Utah L. Rev. 434, 439 (1964).
States have responded to the courteous yielding by the
federal government with a myriad of solutions to discriminatory
conduct.

Host state legislatures have patterned sex

discrimination statutes after the federal public accommodations
law, thereby including explicitly or implicitly a private club
exemption as found in the Federal Act.2

Burns, The Exclusion of

Women from Influential Men's Clubs, 18 Harv. C. R. - C.L. L. Rev.
321, 377 (1983) (hereinafter, "Exclusion of Women").

But there

are also significant differences in state statutes from the
Federal Act, and differences among individual states.

2

Alta Club relies upon Wright v. Salisbury Club, 479 F. Supp.
378 (D.C. Va. 1979), rev'd, 632 F.2d 309 (1980) to support the
position that nonprofit clubs are exempt under federal and state
legislation. APPELLANT BRIEF at 19. However, Salisbury Club was
reversed on the grounds that the club in question was not "truly
private." 479 F. Supp. 378 (D.C. Va. 1979), revfd 632 F.2d 309
(1980) .
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Of those states electing to include gender as a class
to be protected under state civil rights laws, ten statutes do
not include a specific private club exemption.3

Among states

including private club exemptions, a number include restrictions
that, in the absence of compliance, may trigger application of
state civil rights laws to the private club:

Idaho Code § 18-

7302 (Burns 1948) ("where public use is permitted that use shall
be covered by this section"); Iowa Code Ann. S601A.2M0) (West
1974 and Supp. 1986) ("except when such distinctly private place,
establishment, or facility caters or offers services, facilities,
or goods to the nonmembers for a fee or charge or gratuitously,
it shall be deemed a public accommodation during such period");
•Kan. Stat. Ann. §44-1018 (1986) ("unless membership in such
religion is restricted on account of race, color, national origin
or ancestry"); Md. Gen. Prov. Code Ann. §5 (1957) (except to the
extent the club principally engages in selling food or alcoholic
beverages; but not to facilities "designed to accommodate only a
particular sex"); Mich. Stat.

Ann. §3.548(303) (Callaghan 1985 &

Supp. 1986) ("except to the extent that the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations . . . are
made available to the customers or patrons of another
3

Alaska Stat. § 18.80.230 (1986) (subsequently interpreted to
include a "private club" exemption even though no express
language to that effect was included in the statute. United
States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1983)). Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601 (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46-64 (1958);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4503 (1953 & Supp. 1986); Ind. Code Ann.
S 22-9-1-2 (1986); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 §§ 4552, 4591
(1967); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272 § 92A (West 1932); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 363.03 (1969); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-1-102 (1985);
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-14-04 (1985).
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establishment that is a place of public accommodation or is
licensed by the state under Act No. 8 of the Public Acts of
1933*); Neb. Rev. Stat. §20-107 (1983) (liquor license revoked
upon discrimination against "any person who is a guest of a
member of such club"); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §40 (McKinney 1976 &
Supp. 1987) (club forfeits distinctively private status upon
sponsoring or conducting an athletic contest, advertisement of a
contest or exhibition as a state affair, or utilizes the words
"'New York State1" in its announcement); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§942.04(2), (3) (1981 & Supp. 1986) (upon rental of private
facilities to the public).
Finally, California statutes provide that only certain
types of clubs are exempt from anti-discrimination laws.
California lawmakers have fashioned thirty-one separate
definitions of "club."
(West 1984).

Cal. Club Licenses Code §§ 23425-23429

Six of the possible thirty-one organizations are

prohibited from discriminating, distinguishing or restricting any
person on account of gender.
All states now have some form of legislation banning
discrimination in regards to use the of facilities, services or
accommodations, but the proliferation of legislation contains
much diversity in regard to particulars.

States have expanded

proscriptions to apply to such activities as employment, labor
organizations, training programs and access to a profession or
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vocation.*

Some states have special provisions outlawing

discrimination in regard to wages.5

Other anti-discrimination

provisions apply to housing, sale or lease of property and

4 Alaska Stat. §18.80.200(b), 295 (1962); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§20314a, 53-53a (1958); D.C. Code Ann. §1-2512 (1981), Fla. Stat.
Ann. §454.18 (West 1965); Idaho Code §18-7301 (1949); Ind. Code
Ann. §22-9-1-2 (Burns 1986); Kan. Stat. Ann. §44-1001 (1986); Ky.
Rev. Stat. §§344.050, .360, .070, .375 (1983 & Supp. 1986); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §37:2715 (West 1950); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5
§613.330 (1967); Minn. Stat. §155.11 (1969); Neb. Rev. Stat. §20109 (1983); Nev. Rev. Stat. §613.330 (1967); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§278:3 (1966); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 25 §§1303, 1305-06 (1986);
Or. Rev. Stat. §659.030 (1971); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §955
(Purdon 1930); R.I. Gen. Laws §28-5-7 (1956); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. §§16-16-14, 20-13-11 (1967); Vt. Stats. Ann. tit. 21, §§495495c (1939); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§49.04.100 to .130, 49.60.200
(1961); W. Va. Code §5-11-9 (1984); Wis. Stat. Ann. §256.28 (1981
& Supp. 1986).
5

Ark. Stat. Ann. §81-624 (1960); Cal. Labor Code §1197.5 (West
1971); Colo. Rev. Stat. §8-5-102 (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
S§31-75, 31-76 (1958); Ga. Code Ann. §34-5-1 (1981); Hawaii Rev.
Stat. §387-4 (1968); Idaho Code Ann. §§44-1701 to 44-1704 (1948);
Ky. Rev. Stat. §§337.420 (1971); Md. Gen. Prov. Code Ann. §§55A
to H (1957); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 149 §§105A to 105C (West
1932); Mo. Ann. Rev. Stat. §290.400 (1959); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§§652.210 (1971); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §336.3 (Purdon 1930);
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §28-6-18 (1956).
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utility services.^

Still others apply to insurance companies,

credit and lending institutions, brokers and salespeople.7

Utah

Legislators have done no more than other states making
legislative choices as to what entities should appropriately fall
within anti-discrimination laws.

6

Alaska Stat. §§18.80.130, 18.80.200, .240 (1962); Cal. Civ.
Code §53 (West 1954); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §24-34-405 (1973);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§8-45, 46A-64 (1958); D.C. Code Ann. §12515 (1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§4501, 4601 (1953 and Supp.
1986); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§515-3, 515-6, 516-62 (1968); Idaho
Code Ann. §§67-5907, -5909 (1948); 111. Const, art. 1, §17; Ind.
Code Ann. §22-9-1-2 (Burns 1986); Iowa Code §601A.13 (1974); Kan.
Stat. Ann. §§44-1001, 44-1015 to 1016 (1964 & Supp. 1986); Ky.
Rev. Stat. §§344.020, 344.360, 344.375 (1971); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 5 §4583 (1967); Md. Code Ann. Art. 49B, §§21, 22, 24
(1957); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 121, §26FF (West 1932); Minn.
Stat. Ann. §363.03 (1969); Mo. Ann. Stat §110, 215 (1959); Mont.
Const, art. Ill, §3; Neb. Rev. Stat. §§20-105, 20-107, 29-109
(1943 and Supp. 1983); Nev. Rev. Stat. §111.237 (1967); N.H. Rev,
Stat. §§354-A: 3, 354-A:8 (1966); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§10:5-9.1,
46:3-23 (1939); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§28-1-7, 30-13-2 (1978 & Supp.
1981); N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§18a, 42 (McKinney 1976 & Supp.
1987); N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law §5-331 (1969); N.C. Gen. Stat. §62140 (1982); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4111.02 (1971); Okla. Stat. Ann,
tit. 25 §1306 (West 1986); Ore. Rev. Stat. §659.045 (1971); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 43 §953 (1930); S.D. Codified Laws §11-7-61, 2013-29 (1967); Tenn. Code Ann. §§65-422, -423 (1955); Tex. Hum.
Res. 1293a (Vernon 1962); Va. Code §§36-88, -91 (1950); Vt. Stat,
Ann. tit. 13, §§1451, 1452 (1959); Wash. Rev. Code §§49.60.051,
49.60.222, 49.60.224, 80.28.100 (1961); W. Va. Code Ann. §§5-119, 8-12-9 (1984); Wis. Stat. §§101.22, 196.62 (1981 & Supp.
1986) .
7

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§38-61(7), 38-150 (1958); D.C. Code Ann,
§1-2517 (1981); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §515-5 (1968); Idaho Code Ann.
§67-5908 (1948); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§344.367, 344.370 (1971 and
supp. 1986); Md. Gen. Prov. Code Ann. §23 (1957); Mass Gen. Laws
Ann. Ch. 151B, §§1-10 (West 1932); Neb. Rev. Stat. §20-108
(1943); N. M. Stat. Ann. §28-1-7 (1978); N.Y. Ins. Law §40
(McKinney 1976); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 §1008.3, tit. 43, §955
(1930); S.C. Code Ann. §37-148 (1962); S.D. Comp. Laws §20-13-21
(1967); Va. Code. §36-90 (Laws Co-op 1950); Wash. Rev. Code
§§49.60.175, 51.04.030 (1961); W.Va. Code Ann. §5-11-9 (1984);
Wis. Stat. §256.28 (1981 & Supp. 1986).
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Fundamental to the Anglo-American legal system is the
notion that the elected representative legislature is supreme in
law making and shaping major public policy.
550 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1976).

Shelmidine v. Jones,

It is through Utah lawmakers that

current social and public demands resulting from changing
economic and political state of affairs are enabled to find
expression.

Utah common law provided that theatre proprietors

were not obligated to admit all persons desiring to purchase
tickets, but could segregate or exclude persons of any class or
race at pleasure.
818 (Utah 1933).

De La Ysla v. Publix Theatres Corp.. 26 P.2d
Utah's interest in assuring equal access has

changed since 1933 and expanded beyond merely proving access to
tangible goods and services as reflected by the Utah Civil Rights
Act.

All persons within Utah are "entitled to full and equal

accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, goods and
services in all business establishments and'in all places of
public accommodation, and by all enterprises regulated by the
state of every kind whatsoever . . . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-3

(1986) .
Utah lawmakers may act with broad authority to create
rights of public access on behalf of its citizens.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).

Roberts v.

Mr. Justice

Cardozo framed the problem this way, "[w]e do not pause to
consider whether a statute differently conceived and framed would
yield results more consonent with fairness and reason.
the statute as we find it."
(1933).

We take

Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27

If the law appears harsh, its remedy is not in

interpretation but in amendment or repeal.
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B.

ALTA CLUBfS CLAIM OF ASSOCIATIONAL
FREEDOM IS NOT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
MAGNITUDE.

The Alta Club argues that the enforcement of the Utah
Civil Rights Act against it would violate associational freedoms
belonging to its members as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and
the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution and by the Utah
Constitution*

(App. A ) . However, persons with a common interest

may associate exclusively with whom they please only if the
nature of the association falls within the kind of activity
intended to be embraced within constitutional guarantees.

Curran

v. Mt. Diablo Councilf 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325
(Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984);
Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of America, 551 P.2d 465, 475 n. 17 (Or.
1976).

The right of privacy is accorded only to those clubs

functioning as "extensions of members1 homes and not as
extensions of their businesses."

Cornelius-v. Benevolent

Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1204 (D.C. Conn.
1974).

The constitutional protections for which the Alta Club

seeks apply only to social relationships.
In looking to the nature of an organization claiming
associational freedom, the Court has not been satisfied by mere
appearances.

"Some businesses, like the classical country store

where the owner lives overhead or in the rear, makes the store an
extension, so to speak, of the home."

Bell v. Md., 378 U.S. 226,

253 (1964) (Goldberg, J. concurring).

The fact that an

organization qualifies as a "private club" under state liquor
laws is not sufficient to overcome underlying factors supporting
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a contrary conclusion*

Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143,

1153 (S.D. Tex* 1970).

Nor does the fact that a club operates in

a nonprofit capacity foreclose an inquiry into "distinctively
private club" status.

Rotary Club v. Bd. of Directorsf 178 Ca.

App. 3d 1035, 1048, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 220 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.
1986), O U T . postponed, 107 S.Ct. 396 (1986) . 8
Precedent has established some factors determinative of
private club's status in other jurisdictions; such as limited use
of facilities and services by members and bona fide guests, as
well as the history of an organization.
at 1203.

Cornelius, 382 F.Supp.

Each case roust be decided upon its own factual

background.

Wright, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1153.

"The more an

owner', for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."
Bell, 378 U.S. at 314.

The underlying structure of Alta Club's

factual circumstances do not support Alta Club's "home away from
home" facade, because the club is used "in a manner to make it of
public consequence, and affect the community at large."

let. at

314, n. 33.
Membership in the Alta Club is limited to business and
professional men having established outstanding business and
professional credentials in the community (R. 257). Privileges
of the Alta Club may be extended to persons elected to or holding
public office (R. 139) . Courtesies may also be extended "to such
8

A copy of California's brief as amicus curiae is attached
hereto as App. F.
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persons of distinction as the Board shall deem advisable" for a
period of up to three months.

(id*).

Membership is not

restricted to Salt Lake City residents.

As of December 31, 1984,

148 of its 635 members were domiciled outside of Salt Lake City
or the State of Utah (R. 138, 234).
The Alta Club was formed with the primary purpose of
providing na place and the means for the conduct of business
conferences and meetings of business and professional men . . .
and of guests of such members" (R. 133) . The location of the
Clubhouse is designated to be within proximity to the business
district (Id). The emphasis placed upon extending guest
invitations to the politically powerful and influential suggest
minimal reliance upon subjective criteria (R. 139).
Restrictions upon membership to the Alta Club do not
reflect personal prejudices, but practical reasons.

When the

Alta Club was incorporated in 1933, women comprised less than 13
percent of the total work force in the State.
Employment Security, Hard at Work:

Utah Department of

Women in the Utah Labor Force

4 (August 1985) (hereinafter, "Hard at Work") (App. G ) . The Alta
Club's original Articles of Incorporation do not contain an
express restriction against female membership.

The language

employed reflects the Alta Club's notion of the class of society
available to make up the business and professional work force,
not a desire to exclude women.
Nor is the desire to exclude women a part of the Alta
Club's contemporary wishes, at least for the sake of seclusion
alone.

A home represents "the essence of privacy, in no way
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dedicated to public use, in no way extending an invitation to the
public"

Bell, 378 U.S. at 253.

The Alta Club does not envince a

pattern of exclusiveness or a primary objective to provide
facilities only to men who are socially compatible in
recreational and social pursuits*

Business, professional and

nonworking women may patronize the Alta Club.

(R. 143-44).

The

Alta Club caters social and business affairs for any organization
when sponsored by a club member.

(R. 143-144).

The freedom by

which women may associate as guests and business associates, but
not members, fatally undermines the notion that the social
intimacy offered by the Alta Club is adversely affected by the
presence of women.

See, Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.

718 (1982) (men allowed to take classes offered by an all female
university).

In short, there is an expansive difference between

the activity conducted within the walls of the Alta Club and the
association found within the comforts and ltixuries of a home.
C.

ANY CLAIM BY ALTA CLUB OF ASSOCIATIONAL
FREEDOM IS OUTWEIGHED BY UTAH'S COMPELLING
INTEREST.

Upon a finding that an associational activity rises to
the level of Constitutional magnitude, a court must weigh whether
the state's interest in eradicating discrimination justifies
infringement on the organization's associational freedom.
Roberts v. United States Javcees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Sigma Chi
Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo.f 258 F. Supp. 515, 525
(1966).

Only minimal protection is afforded the right of

intimate association.

468 U.S. at 618.
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Stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship
to actual abilities diminish the dignity of the individual,
endangers the public and deprives society the benefits of
political, economic and social integration.
The experience with the freedom or civil
rights movement of black people has made it
clear that withholding of equal rights is
different from slavery only in degree, and
that ultimate personal liberty depends on the
civil right to be treated equally with other
people, without discrimination because of
race, other minority membership, sex, or any
other ground.
3A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction, §74.01, at 626
(4th ed. 1986) .
As of 1984, 40 percent of Utahfs female population were
employed in managerial and professional occupations.
Work, 52.

Hard at

Regardless of education, experience or occupation,

women have averaged only 60 percent of male counterpart earnings
over the last three decades.

i<3. at 74. A* growing number of

economists believe that a "two-track" system is emerging with
female inroads into top management being stymied,

id. at 69.

Although many of the clubs and organizations
which close their doors to women insist they
do no harm because they are strictly social
or purely altruistic, in fact they are places
for profitable exchange with business and
professional colleagues and clients. They
provide settings where individuals pursuing
career-related ventures have opportunities to
display their talents and be helped in their
career development.
Exclusion of Women, 18 Harv. C. - C.L.L. Rev. 321, 330 n. 30.
Membership to the right club often holds the key to development
and maintenance of political and economic success as well as
community leadership, id. at 323 n. 4.
-25-

Membership in the Alta

Club conveys automatic business and professional recognition and
provides the opportunity for contact with resident and nonresident leaders, as well as enhanced leadership skills through
board membership or position as a club officer.
"Indivious private discrimination may be characterized
as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the
First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative
constitutional protections."

Hishon v. King and Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 78 (1984) .
In constitutional terms, club members who
defend the exclusion of women rely upon
rights of privacy and association, but
neither right includes the ability to exclude
women from clubs. The constitutional right
to privacy has been defined as an aspect of
liberty encompassing a sphere of private life
rarely extending beyond the narrow confines
of home and family.
Exclusion of Women, at 347. The clubhouse is simply, "not on the
same constitutional plane as is the bedroom-or study."
Cornelius, 382 F. Supp, at 1195-96.
Moreover, where a club associates freely with the class
of persons it claims protection from, there is no basis for
concluding that, having considered and found favorable the
application of a female professional of the caliber now
associating with the club, the organization's ability to engage
in selective membership objectives will be impeded or radically
changed.

Like the Minnesota Act upheld by the Supreme Court in

Roberts v. Javcees, Utah "abridges no more speech or
associational freedom than is necessary to accomplish that
purpose."

468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984).
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The State has a compelling interest in avoiding the
perception that it condones rigid perceptions held by enterprises
it regulates that women are not appropriate participants where
business and professional power is exercised.
IcJlubs can be seen as the community's spinal
column, connecting the vertebrae of business,
industry, finance, politics, the universities
and the foundations. Within the clubs, this
spine can stiffen with the relentless
homogeneity of an anachrostic power
structure, or it can be supple enough to
support a more dynamic city.
Exclusion of Women at 405.

Participation of women at the seminal

stage where political and economic decisions are made are, in
many ways, a greater harm than occupational segregation; because
the decisions made are later translated into policy and practice
affecting all society.

"The right of men to associate in what is

clearly more than a social capacity must give way to the right of
women to associate at the level where contacts are made,
0

relationships are developed and deals are struck."

Id. at 407.

POINT III
THE TERM "ALL PLACES OF BUSINESS WHICH
SELL BEER TO CONSUMERS- IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
CLEAR AND EXACT.
The provisions of the Utah Civil Rights Act are
constitutional clear and exact.

The Alta Club urges that the

phrase "all places of business which sell beer to consumers" is
vague on the basis that the phrase "place of business" either
means "'a profit-seeking enterprise1" and therefore does not
a

PPlY to the Alta Club, or is simply too vague to pass

constitutional muster.

APPELLANTS BRIEF at 35-36. A similar

argument is made about the term "consumers."
-27-

Id. at 36.

Application of the facts of record to constitutionally-imposed
standards, however, supports a ruling that would uphold the Act.
The Utah Supreme Court has described the standard to be
applied in determining vagueness:
When state action impinges on fundamental
rights, due process requires standards which
clearly define the scope of permissible
conduct so as to avoid unwarranted intrusion
on those rights. The statute which affects
fundamental liberties is unconstitutional if
it is so vague that "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning . . . ."
In re the Matter of Nelda Bover, 636 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1981)
(citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1925)).

Vagueness issues relate essentially to procedural due

process; that is, whether the statute adequately provides notice
of the required conduct.

Connally, 269 U.S. at 391. A statute

will not be declared unconstitutionally vague if its language is
"sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct
is prohibited." State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 50, 51 (Utah 1982).
Statutes are endowed with a strong presumption of
validity, Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983),
and legislation will not be declared invalid for vagueness unless
it is so imperfect as to render it capable of no reasonable
construction that will give it effect.

Kent Club v. Toronto, 305

P.2d 870, 873 (Utah 1957); Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 807
(Utah 1974).

The Utah Civil Rights Act clearly indicates that

all places of business electing to sell beer or liquor to its
members and patrons may not discriminate on the basis of gender.
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Blacks Law Dictionary defines the phrase "place of
business" as, "Itlhe location at which one carries on his
business or employment,"
(1979)9 p. 1034.

Black1s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition

The term "business" is further defined by

Black's Law Dictionary as follows:
Employment, occupation, profession, or
commercial activity engaged in for gain or
livelihood. Activity or enterprise for gain,
benefit, advantage or livelihood. . . .
Enterprise in which person engaged shows
willingness to invest time and capital on
future outcome . . . . That which habitually
busies or occupies or engages the time,
attention, labor, and effort of persons as a
principle serious concern or interest or for
livelihood or profit.
Blackfs Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition (1979), p. 179.
According to Alta Club Articles of Incorporation, the
Alta Club "is organized in, and its principal place of business
shall be at Salt Lake City. . . ."

(R. 133) (emphasis added).

The Articles of Incorporation further provide that:
The object, purpose and pursuit of said
corporation is and shall continue to be, to
acquire, equip, maintain, operate and
establish • . . within reasonable proximity
to the business district. . . a place and the
means for the conduct of business conferences
and meetings of business and professional men
who shall comprise its members and of guests
of such members. . . . [T]his corporation
shall have power to acquire, sell, receive,
hold, improve and disprove of such property,
real and personal, whether obtained by
purchase, gift or devise, as may be necessary
or desirable to carry on or promote the
objects of this corporation.
(R. 133).
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The Alta Club is a business.

The Alta Club entrusted

to its Board of Directors "the management of the business and
affairs of this corporation and the care, custody and control of
the corporate property."

id. at 2.

Board members are authorized

to determine, levy and collect fees, dues and assessments, and to
expell members for default under payments due. id.

Directors

authorize all club expenditures including the hiring, salaries,
Christmas bonuses and removal of its employees, id. at. 3, 23.
Members are not liable for corporate debts but may receive a
portion of surplus of assets over obligations in the event of
dissolution,

id. at 6.

The Alta Club is open between the hours

of 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m. during which time members and guests
may enjoy the services and amenities offered by the dining rooms,
bar, barber shop and other facilities, including the parking lot.
id. at 21.
The legislative history and stated purposes of the Act
are clear that the definition of business is intended to be
broadly construed to apply to all types of businesses which offer
all types of goods, services and facilities.

Utah Code Ann. §13-

7-1 (1986) . The activities engaged in by the Alta Club meet the
definition of "business" found in Black's Law Dictionary and the
words used by the Alta Club itself in forming its organization
support the conclusion that its corporation is a place of
business.
The term "consumer" is defined in Black's Law
Dictionary as "[o]ne who consumes.

Individuals who purchase,

use, maintain, and dispose of products and services.
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A member of

that broad class of people who are affected by pricing policies,
financing practices, quality of goods and services, credit
reporting, debt collection, and other trade practices. . . ."
Black1s Law Dictionary, 286 (4th ed. 1979).

Members of the Alta

Club and their guests purchase and consume food and beverages.
They pay for the privilege of use and enjoyment of the club's
facilities and services and members forfeit privileges where
credit has been extended but not paid.

(R. 133)•

The Utah Civil Rights Act is not overbroad.

Statutory

overbreadth, unlike a vagueness challenge, raises substantive due
process concerns regarding whether, "•the statute in question is
so broad that it may not only prohibit unprotected behavior but
may also prohibit constitutionally protected activity as well."1
Utah v. Frampton, No. 20279 (Utah April 9, 1987).

It is well

established that the state may legitimately regulate the sale of
beer and liquor for the protection of its citizens. Any
organization desiring to sell alcoholic products must be licensed
to do so.

Utah Code Ann., Title 32A (1986).

Members of a social

club may discriminate against those persons it so pleases in the
context of purely social relationships.

When a club elects to

apply for and receive a license to sell alcoholic beverages, it
thereby becomes an enterprise regulated by the state subject to
such rules and regulations attached to the license.
Toronto. 305 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 1957).

Kent Club v.

It follows, then, that

since neither the Utah nor United States Constitution protects
individious discrimination by business regulated by the state,
challenges based upon broadness claims are without merit.
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CONCLUSION
Legislative history and circumstances surrounding the
Utah Civil Rights Act support a ruling that a club desiring to
sell beer and liquor to patrons is an "enterprise regulated by
the state" and therefore must abide by state regulations
concerning gender discrimination.
The Alta Club's claim of associational freedom does not
rise to the level intended to be embraced within constitutional
guarantees, and is further outweighed by Utah's interest in the
elimination of gender discrimination by enterprises regulated by
the state.
The language of the Act is sufficiently clear to define
the scope of permissible conduct and does not impose upon
activity protected by either the state or federal constitutions.
Therefore, this Court should find the Utah Civil Rights Act
constitutional on its face and as applied to the Alta Club.
DATED this /*~

day of ^C/^r^

, 1987.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DIANE W. WILKINS
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT I

AMENDMENT I
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances.

UTAH CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE I, Section 1

Section 1.
rights.]

[Inherent and inalienable

All men have the inherent and inalienable
right to enjoy and defend their lives and
liberties: to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the
dictates of their consciences; to assemble
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to
communicate freely their thoughts and
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of
that right.

APPENDIX B

April 14, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
As the Official Officer and Secretary of the Utah State
Senate f I do attest to and certify that the attached transcript of
HB No. 311, DISCRIMINATION ON BASIS OF SEX, is a true and actual
record taken from the Official Senate Recordings, #320, March 8,
1973.
Respectfully submitted,

Sophia C. Buckmiller
Official Officer and
Secretary, Utah State Senate
My Commission expires
May 1, 1987

Senator Howe:

Mr. President, I was just calling

Representative Urie to see if she wanted to come over and explain
it tH.B. No. 311] —

but, I think it's rather self-explanatory.

The purpose of it is, I think, to put into our law, a prohibition
against discrimination on account of sex.
on —

We already have it

that we can't discriminate on the basis of race, color,

religion, ancestry, national origin; but it was not discrimination on the basis of sex was not included, in this
written law, which was passed in 1965.

This is the law, the

antidiscrimination law really of 1965.

Then I note also that it

includes not only places of public accommodation but in
enterprises regulated by the state.

Now Ifm not just sure,

frankly, what that means, "enterprises regulated by the state,"
but I suppose that it would be —
. Senate President:

It's - the explanation is on the

next page, Senator Howe.
Senator Howe:

Oh.

Senate President:
everybody . . .
Senator Howe:

Line 19. [Pause]

That's right.

Just about

In other words, it just,

applies, prohibits discrimination generally against women.
not doing —

We're

discriminating now anyhow so this bill won't hurt

anybody.
Senate President:

I'm, I'm not sure about one thing

—

can you tell me for sure —
Senator Howe:

About what?

Senate President:

I almost hate to mention it —

but,

the only place I know of, is the Alta Club that has a separate
entrance for women

—

[laughter]
Senator Howe: This, this may change that
Senator [not identified]:
President:

—

Mr. President . . .

Senator

Senator [not identified]:

Senator Howe, are you open

for question?
Senator Howe:

I will.

Senator [not identified]:

Senator Howe, it seem to me,

that on the Equal Rights Amendment, that the place we got into
trouble was where there might be additional responsibilities
under the law, to women.

Now this pretty well confines it to the

idea that you can't discriminate against a woman as far as taking
away privileges and so we're not really talking about the same
thing here are we?
Senator Howe:
limited.

No.

This, this is just much, much

This isn't the whole area like the E.R.A. was.
. . . .

Discrimination on Basis of Sex:

Hearing on H.B. 311,

40th Leg., 1973 Utah Laws 33 (statements of Sen. Warren E. Pugh,
President, and Sen. Richard C. Howe).

APPENDIX C

MEMORANDUM

#1

To:

Utah State Legislature

Prom:

Utah Liquor Control Commission

Date:

January 9# 1985

Re:

B. No.
, Alcoholic Beverage Control Act,
1985f General Session.

This memorandum has been prepared to highlight and explain the
attached proposed legislation revising Utah's present Liquor Control Act, Title 32 of the Utah Code, and Utah's Non-profit Private Club Act, Sections 16-6-12.1 through 17. A second memorandum covering the legislation chapter by chapter is separately
attached.

Legislative History of Utah's Liquor Laws

Most of the existing law today governing the control and regulation of the sales, storage and consumption of liquor and other
alcoholic products in the state was enacted in 1935t following
the repeal of prohibition. This basic law has been the subject
of numerous minor amendments over the years dealing mainly with
the internal functioning of the commission. The majority of
these have concerned raising the taxes on beer and liquor, adJusting fees and operating budgets, allocating the revenues from
liquor sales, creating a director of liquor control, either increasing or decreasing the size of the commission and modifying
its duties, creating a citizens' council and a liquor law enforcement division of public safety. Some major amending efforts
have occurred Including the provision for non-profit private
locker clubs In 1955• eliminating the use of private permits by

(f) Adopting, as far as applicable, the much more comprehensive forfeiture procedures of Utah's present Controlled Substance Act for forfeiting to the atate alcoholic products or property used in violation of this
•ct;

(h) Clearly identifying those prosecuting agencies
having the responsibility for initiating prosecutions
under this act and delineating how such prosecutions
are initiated;

(10) Providing a dram shop act which, unlike present law, clearly covers all alcoholic beverages (including 3-2 percent by
weight beer).

(11) Establishing a bureau within the department of public safety responsible for the enforcement of this act;

(12) Adopting a standard form of weights and measures utilized
by the federal government in describing alcoholic products, to
wit: percent of alcohol by volume rather than by weight. Thus,
*3-2 beer" is now referred to as beer having lJ.0 percent of alcohol by volume.

The commission has endeavored throughout this legislation to preserve, wherever possible, the substantive provisions of Utah's
present liquor laws and, as stated earlier, has retained the
overall philosophy and policies of those laws. Indeed, it is the
commission's view that it is an entity of government having the
duty to enforce the laws presented to it by the Legislature, and
should avoid becoming Involved in disputes over what the substance of the law ahould or ahould not be. Such efforts are better left to the various factions of the community interested in
and affected by liquor control. However, during the course of
preparing this legislation, the commission encountered some areas

of the present law where tome substantive change would clearly
Improve the administration and effectiveness of the overall law.
Bather than defer action in hopes that the amending process might
make the needed improvements at a later time, the commission
chose to incorporate them into this legislation, but did ao most
cautiously and only where it felt the effectiveness of the law
would be enhanced. Those few substantive changes proposed by
this legislation which are of significance are outlined below.

Substantive Changes in the New Legislation

1.

The concept that liquor sales in restaurants and private
clubs are from "state liquor stores" located in an area
within such facilities which is leased by the state, but
operated by a vendor associated with the restaurant or club,
has been eliminated in favor of a licensing system with Increased and more direct regulation of the licensee. The new
system results in a tightening of existing law and more
closely resembles the actual administrative practice of the
present commission. The "state store in restaurants and
clubs" concept originated in the 1969 amendments to authorize the sale of liquor in such facilities, yet still
give the state a degree of control over the liquor outlet so
that the state could, at will, and with or without cause,
close "its" outlet and remove "its" liquor.

As a practical matter, this concept adds a non-essential
administrative burden on the department, causes duplicated
paperwork in the authorization and regulation of such outlets, and requires the use of artificial lease agreements
between the state and such facilities.

All clubs where liquor is consumed are required under present law to have licenses from the commission to allow the

atorage and consumption of liquor on their premises. Restaurants must obtain local government approval before they
can apply to the commission to have a "state store*1 on their
premises which virtually always includes obtaining a local
atorage and consumption license. (See U.C.A., Sections 108-*J2 and 10-13-6). Thus, restaurants and clubs having socalled "state stores" on their premises from which liquor
sales nay be made are licensed anyway and the vendor of that
atore is usually the same person or entity accountable under
the license. The commission, in fact, now Issues state
store leases and liquor consumption licenses to clubs in
tandem, and almost always suspends or revokes the consumption and storage license in tandem with the state store
lease where a violation of the act has occurred. However,
recently the commission sought to summarily remove "its"
state store from a private club pursuant to the concept that
it was really closing its own store and removing its own
liquor. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that despite the language of the act, the club nevertheless had a property
interest in having the state store located on its premises,
and held that the club was entitled to a modicum of procedural due process before the state could close and remove
the state store. See Celebrity Club. Inc.. vs. ULCC. Utah,
657 P.2d 1292 (1982). x
Thus, the State's only effort to assert the legal distinction between the license Issued to a club (which admittedly
carries with it a limited property Interest once issued) and
the leasing of space within a club for a state store (to
avoid the assertion of a property interest by the club in
the outlet) has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.

1

The club has also filed a civil rights suit in federal court
against the commission for its summary action which Is presently
pending in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

. n

.

The "state store" concept also requires the commission to
Bake nominal monthly lease payments to restaurants and clubs
throughout the state to pay for the space within the premises where the state store Is located. While the cost Is
nominal, it adds to the administrative paperwork of the
agency. Also the lease arrangement creates questions of
liability when thefts, damage, etc., occur, and could create
similar liability questions under the Dram Shop provisions.
(Confusion is created over who really owns and has control
over the liquor.)

The new legislation has dropped the "state store" concept in
favor of regulating the sales outlets in restaurants and
clubs under a single license which authorizes the storage,
consumption * and sales of liquor on the premises. The
operational restrictions on the restaurants and clubs has
been Increased to give the commission greater regulatory
control over such licensees. In the event a violation is
found after due process has been accorded to the licensee,
the license is suspended or revoked which necessarily leads
to the removal of the liquor from the premises among other
sanctions. No leases are required under this system, and
the state has really not lost any real degree of actual control over the outlet.

Finally, this system does not convert Utah from a control
state to a so-called license state. In fact, all control
states utilize this license system. A true license state is

* Consumption of liquor in restaurants would still be permislible without a license from the state if authorized by local
luthorlty. However, atorage and sales would have to be authorized by a state license as a substitute for the state's control under the "state store" concept. Arguably, with the added
restrictions on operation under the new legislation, the extent
»f state control would actually Increase over that of present
law.

APPENDIX D

M E M O R A N D U M
TO: Utah State Legislature
FROM: Utah Liquor Control Commission
DATE:
RE: S.B, N0.__, ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL ACT, 1985, GENERAL
SESSION.

This memo has been prepared for the legislature to detail
and enhance the accompanying summary memorandum. Contained in
this memo is a detailed section-by-section comparison of the
proposed Alcoholic Beverage Control Act with the now existing
Utah liquor laws. All additions to and deletions from the
current law have also been noted. Any significant changes
contained in this proposed act are high-lighted and where
necessary an explanation of the change has been included.
The memo has been written in an outline form progressing
section-by-section through the PROPOSED statutes. To completely
appreciate all of the changes which have been made and to
understand where and how the original law has been retained, it
is suggested that the reader compare both the new statute and the
present law from which it was derived. For the sake of brevity
the outline does not always use complete sentences and so the
indulgence of the reader is requested.
DETAILED CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER OUTLINE
CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL PROVISIONS
CURRENT

PROPOSED

32-1-1

32-1-1. Name of act changed to Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act to better reflect the scope of administration the commission and department are charged to
fulfill.

New Section 32-1-2.

Effective date of the law.

New Section 32-1-3. Application of this law to present
licensees, permittees and violators of the act.

1

32-1-50,
1-53,1-56,
1-58

32-9-^• Application requirements. A merger of sev*ral current sections into one section. Few substantive changes. A new $100 non-refundable application fee has been added.

32-1-51

32-9-5-

32-1-50,
1-53#1-56

32-9-6. Operational restrictions. Few changes from
present law. Some restrictions, including new
accounting provisions for warehousers have been added.

Bond.

New bonding requirement of $10,000.

CHAPTER 10 - BEER WHOLESALING; RETAIL BEER SALES
32-H-16

-32-10-1. Beer Wholesaling. Commission's power to
grant beer wholesaling licenses.

32-^-16

32-10-2. Qualifications. Prohibits convicted felons
and minors from obtaining a license., No wholesaler
say also retail beer.

New Section 32-10-3. Duties before granting. Outlines all considerations the commission must make before granting
a license.
32-H-16

32-10-JJ. Application requirements. A new clearer
statement of what applicants must present to the
commission for its consideration.

New Section 32-10-5.

Bond.

New $10,000 bonding requirement.

32-14-16

32-10-6. Operational restrictions. A basic restatement of present law with provisions from
present regulations added.

32-H-17

32-10-7. Retail licenses.
sent law.

No changes from pre-

New Section 32-10-8. Prohibited possessions. New section meant
to control the distribution of beer from the wholesale to the retail level.

CHAPTER 11 - BEER TAXES
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SECTION 2
SUMMARY OF F I N D I N G S
In Utah, women eofspr:** more than 41 percent of the work force.
That percentage is eonsister.i
increasing.
Host women, married rr i.
t, work because of economic
necessity, rorty-five percert c: ai: working women in Utah are single or
separated. Two-earner househoics increased from 22 percent to 50 percnt
from 1960 to I960. Adoitional women work in support of displaced workers
(husbands underemployed or unemployed due to technolo&ic?l advances).
An average woman works 26 years—up from 14.5 years in 1950. They
are deployed primarily in secondary or part-time positions providing
little pay, few benefits, inadequate family support systems, and limited
opportunity for advancement. In Utah, women are paid 54^ for every SI
earned by sen. This pay differential has not significantly changed in 20
years.
Occupational s e g r e g a t i o n * poor compensation, aM l i m i t e d career
o p p o r t u n i t i e s are primarily rooted in' iong-stervdiojg c u l t u r a l maife-ZeaAle
s t e r e o t y p i n g which, d e s p i t e the f a c t s , cnntini/c to asfcign *en to the
work-plate and woven tQ the hotoe, i n s t i t u t umal s t r u c t u r e s , founded on
s t e r e o t y p i n g , deprive women of achieving economic indeperd^nca arui
deprive the work place of t h e i r . p o t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n .
Families headed by females comprise the fastest growing segment of
the poverty population in Utah and in the United States. In Utah, the
number of families with female heads has grown to 10 percent. Forty-two
percent (12,100) of these families with children under 18 live below the
poverty level. Both in Utah and nationwide this is a rapidly
accelerating problem auguring long-range catastrophic consequences.
The recoraendations that follow are based on these findings.
A.

SUKHAPY RECOMMENDATIONS
1.

to Business and Industry:

Business and industry has a stake in helping female heads-of
households living in poverty overcome obstacles limiting women's ability
to become self-sufficient. Business and industry also has a stake in
helping single female heads of households successfully integrate into the
work force. Therefore, business and industry has a responsibility to
help solve problems that plague women such as equal pay for equal work,
inadequate or non-existent child care, lack of access to transportation,
inflexible work schedules and hours, inadequate health insurance and
retirement benefits.
A meaningful job with adequate pay is the key to solving the
economic and family problems facing single female heads-of-households
Business and industry is the primary keystone for providing these jobs.
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COAL: THE COMMUNITY, 1NCLUDINC TEACHERS. ADMINISTRATORS. PARENTS,
AND~OTHERS MUST BE HADE AWARE OF THE ABSOLUTE IMPORTANCE OF
PROV1D1NC THE KIND OF EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH CIRLS ARE
ENCOURAGED TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT.
Recommendation: Organize a speaker's bureau, under the
sponsorship of the Governor's office, consisting of
knowledgeable individuals to tell the community of the
importance of promoting educational practices that encourage
girls to become self-sufficient.
Recommendation: Encourage groups and organizations involved
in parent education to include a section, in their
curriculum, emphasizing the development of skills that will
enable women to achieve a self-sufficient status.
Recommendation: Give public recognition to programs that
successfully promote the concept of self-sufficiency for
womer* and to individual women who have become
self-sufficient.
Responsible Entities:
Governor
Parent-Teacher Associations
Media
Groups offering Parents Courses
Teachers/Principals Parents

SOCIETAL AKJ CULTURAL BAPPIERS

SHORT-TERM

SOLUTIONS

BAPrlEP
Many women are unprepared educationally (lack of skills) and
emotionally (lack ox self-esteer: and underestimation of skills and
abilities^ to enter the jot market.
COAL: INCREASE SELF-ESTEEM OF WOMEN WHO UNDERESTIMATE THEIR
SKILLS AND ABILITIES TO ENTER THE JOB KAKKET.
Recommendation: Hake mechanisms available that assess
present skills and abilities which are transferable to the
job market.
Recomendat ion • Provide testing instruments that measure
aptitudes, interest, and career potential.
Rtcommtndat ion: Strengthen and develop programs of
education and skills training, (personal, social tad
technical) that prepare women for work and career mobility.
RtcoiTfttendat ion: Strengthen and develop appropriate support
systems and resources (day care, transportation, counseling,
etc.).
-20-

Responsible Entities:
Job Service
Skills Training Centers
Churches
Legislature
University Program
Families

Department of Social Services
Labor Training Office
Private Non-Profit Organizations
Civic Service Organizations
Vocational and Extension Programs

COAL: INCREASE EDU TV-^d. PREPARATION OF WOMEN HATCHED TO THE
CURRENT JOB MARKET .M\, GROWTH TRENDS.
Recommends*: n: Tailor educational and skills training to
rer.it in r^ rketable skills that relate to job availability
with growth potential.
Recommendation: Assess realistic growth trends in
employment and make available to this population.
Recommendation:

Provide paid on-the-job experience.

Rec ommenda tion: Tailor educational methods to meet the
special needs of adult females to provide positive
reinforcement.
Recommendation: Provide physical access to information
about General Equivalency Diploma preparation and testing.
Recommendation: Strengthen and develop appropriate systems
and resources (day care, transportation, counseling, etc.).
Responsible Entities:
Employers
Legislature
Job Services
Department of Social Services
Media
Bureau of Economic Development
Churches
Volunteer Associations
Local School Districts/Adult Education
University Continuing Education, Vocational and
Extension Programs
COAL: INCREASE PUBLIC AWARENESS OF SUCCESSFUL PERFORMANCE AND
ADVANCEMENT OF TARGET POPULATION.
Recommendation: Target specific and substantial resources
through Jobs Training Partnership Act, National Alliance of
Businesses, etc for low income women.
Recommendation:
a.
b.

Establish ongoing public relations to:

highlight and reward successful performance of
women.
highlight and raward svccessful participation of
•mployers, madia, government agencies and support
groups.
•21-

c.

create laechanisms to ensure continuity through:
i. loaned executives to solicit participation
from other businesses.
lie legislation for scholarship opportunities
through unemployment insurance, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AJDC)
transfers to e-mployers, atate tax credits, etc

BecoTTgnendat ion- Educate atnployers regarding fiscal
incentives for hiring low income women.
Responsible Entities:
Job Service
Employers
Legislature
Bureau of Economic Development
Chamber of Commerce JTPA, BABs, etc.
Media
Department of Social Services
Churches
Civic and Service Organizations
County and Local Governments
Volunteer Associations
University Continuing Education, Vocational and
txtension Programs

BAFFIEP
Laws, policies and practices that directly or indirectly
continue to discriminate against woren
CCAL° CHANCE LAWS. POLICIES AKD PRACTICES THAT DIRECTLY OR
IKIKECT^Y DISCRIMINATE ACA1WCT WOKE*.
Becorrvendation:
books

Review and identify laws currently on the

Becoraendaticn: Introduce corrective legislation with
enforcement provisions.
Recomendat ion: Beview and identify employment policies and
practices in both the public and private sector.
Becommendat ion
Becommend policies and practices that
create econotric equity, innovative work scheduling and
fringe benefits tailored to the needs of ferrule single heads
of households
Responsible EntitiesJob Service
Employers
Legislature
Bureau of Economic Development
Chamber of Commerce JTPA, BABs, etc
Media
Department of Social Services
Churches
Civic and Service Organizations
County and Local Governments
Volunteer Associations
University Continuing Education, Vocational and
Extension Programs
-22-

BARRIER:

Lack of the use of networks by. for, and In behalf of women.

COAL: THE CREATION AND 51RENCTHENINC OF METVORXS, BY, rOH AND ON
BEHALF OF WOMEN.
Recommendation: I-*PT
fy networks which currently exist and
significant contacts vit).n those networks.
RecoTTtmendation:
and needs.

Educate existing networks as to problems

Recommendation:

Create networks which focus on these needs.

Recommendation:

Educate women on how to use them.

Responsible Entities:
Business Assoc.
Professional Associations
Labor Unions
Private Non-Profit Organizations
Media
Chamber of Commerce
Churches
Civic Organizations
Educational and Vocational Institutions

LONG TERM

SOLUTIONS:

BARRIER: Societal and cultural beliefs that encourage women to accept
a role in which they are dependent, which creates:
a.
b.
c.

feelings of guilt if they work outside the home
discouragement of career aspirations
encouragement of the tendency to marry at an early age

COAL: TO CHANCE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL BELIEFS THAT CAUSE WOMEN TO BE
DEPENDENT.
RecoTTTnendation: Increase awareness of the extent of women
end their children in poverty.
Recommendation: Educate children as to the social and
economic issues relating to families:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
%.

Costs related to the maintenance of marriage and family.
Social and economic costs of marital break-up and
remarriage resulting from death, divorce and dissertion.
Social and economic costs for children out-of-wedlock.
Chances for failure of an early marriage.
Increased self-esteem and self-fulfillment resulting
from meaningful salaried employment.
Advantages and options of dual-parental sources of
income.
Educate girls as to their responsibility to be eble to
eupport themselves.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Mnn> slates, MM Intl
I n l!>77, t h r R o t a r y C l u b of D u n r t e ( D u a r t e ) a d m i t t e d

C a l i f o r n i a . ••n:iff«*«l statutes I'm Imlilinir di>ei imiiintion
mhlir ai*rtiniiiitMla1i<MiN in respon>e to I!••• holdtiii: in Mir

Hirer women as members.

I Itnilit* tax*.

voked h n a r l e ' s e h a r t e r a s a lorn I R o t a r y C l u h and t e r m i -

!•»•• r . s . : : i i^s::), that the federal gov

iient hatl no jNiwi r 1o p i o h i h i l >in h p r i v a t e i l i ^ n iinina
/i»fi-/,o HfllsiitH

In.

I . Mtth",,,H,

IYM\ I S. JS, I I I

n:tf<••! i t *
that

iiirmhri^hip

I t o t n r y liiternationnl then re-

in R o t a r y

h t i a r t e hud violatetl its oliliiratiou to ah'ule hy the

rules of R o t a r y I n t e r n a t i o n a l .

IS).
Appellant*

herein

challenge

tin* application

of

tin*

International, claiming

These rules require local

I t o t a r y Cluhs to limit m e m b e r s h i p to men.

nil C i v i l Rights Art to p i o h i h i l d U e i imiiintion mi lite

h u a r t e . together w i t h two of its women mernhrrs t sued

s o f >e\ hy a hn;:e association of p r i v a t e eluhs and

I t o t a r y I n t e l n a t i o n a l f o r i n j u n c t i v e ;mtl declaratory relief,

contend Dial 1 lit* I iiruh A f t is uiironstitulionallx
overbroad.

vague

seeking to e n j o i n

Itotary

International

from

revoking

T h e S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a has a dircet ami

I h m r t e ' s e h a r t e r and f r o m e n f o r c i n g the male only meni-

pclling interest in p r e s e r v i n g its statute and therefore

hership rule, nnd seeking n d c r l a r a t i o n Hint Hie male only

rs this i'oiiit to grant n p | cllees* motion to dismiss tin*

rule violated the C n r u h C i v i l Rights A r t , C a l i f o r n i a C i v i l

nal, or f in the a l t e r n a t i v e , to a f f i r m t!••• derision of the

Code seetiou 5 1 , and A r t i r l e I , § M of the C u l i f o r n i a Con-

rt hrlow.

stitution.

T h r S t a t r of C a l i f o r n i a h a * a s t r o n g i n t n r s l in pre
•ing the hrond i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
**ed in the ilrrisimi hrlow
•eal.

of

thr

I 'nriili

Art

lev t h r C a l i f o r n i a C o i n ! ol

Tin* c o u r t ' * i n t i i p r r l a t i o n is roiisislrnl with thr

Uison law of C a l i f o r n i a and w i t h tin* legislative deep
i In codify t h r rmninon law.

C m I h r i m o i e , the S t a i r

C a l i f o r n i a , ns expressed in A r t i r l e

I, \H

of the Cali-

ilia Constitution 1 has a s t r o n g puhlie policy of ensnr
that hiisiness opportunities are not denied mi the hasis
<cx.

1

T h e Los Angeles C o u n t y S u p e r i o r Court ruled in f a v o r

e\-

Artie I f I, ^ II fit the C .tlitorm.i ( n r e t i h i t i o o provides ",i pcrm.iy nol h e chsi|ii.ihliril I r u m enlenop, <M ptn\umj' % .i I H I M s, profession, vo< .ilion or emplr i\ i n e o l tici.tiise ot s « \ , I.lie,
e<l, < olor, or n.thon.il or e l h n i i origin "

of Rotary

International

tin* C i i i u h Act.
that

Ifolarv

r i n d i n g that it hatl not violated

T h e C o u r t of Appeal reversed, concluding

International

was a loudness

establishment

w i t h i n Hie m e a n i n g or the C n r u h Act and thus was prohibited f r o m d i s c r i m i n a t i n g on the hasis o f sex.
Thr

Court

of A p p e a l denied R o t a r y

International**

petition f o r r e h e a r i n g a m i the C a l i f o r n i a Supreme Court
denied its petition fur review.

4

•I

SUMMARY Or ARGUMENT

ARGUMENT

ruse ilne* not present it siihsfniilinl (Vtlcral i|iiesinvolves issue* fh;il were <|cci<lc«l hy this Court
7* r. fnilnl

Stutrs ./•*/* t i > . 4(M l \ N . fill!I ( I ' l S I )

I. THIS CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION
A. Rotary International Cannot Assert a Constitutional Right of Intimate Association.

eiita no Hicls Hull woiihl ilistiuuuish il from I In*

ittt ram*.
ry International i* not Hie ty|x» of orjrani/alion
cinder*, m i l i n l i n g lo Huberts,
til rights of iiititiiulo

mny nssert first

This nisi* presents issues already di-cided hy (his Court
in Huberts t.

IH'IVII

Slates .huteees. 4(M t \ K . WW (I!W4).

expressive association.

That decision held that tin* rnnstitntion protects freedom

otary International has tin Imtiiiiii meinliers its it

of iissofinlioii in two forms - freedom of intimate associa-

Krifilioii of mcml»ei>hip chilis.

tion mi.I freedom of expressive association.

IIIMI

Itnscil on litis fact

-MM C.S. at

ihstantinl dusiiicss-like nlliitalics, (In* slnlc Court

1117 l!IM.

According to Hie court, "certain intimate human

nsistcnt willi Itnbvrt*.

ffliiiml Hint Notary Itiler-

relationshi|is must lie secure*I against nnilue intrusion hy

fin It! not insulate its (mlicy of iliscriiuituilitiK on

the Slate hecausc of the role of such relationship* in safe-

of sex in nictitdcrship froni operation of tin* I'n-

guarding the individual rreeilom Hint is eenlral lo our con-

iliseriminnlion.

stitutional scheme*' (MM l \ S . at I»I7-(SI8) ami the Con-

iilsn t*oiif |iiile<l9 consistent with Huberts, Hint any

stitution guarantees a right to associate for the purpose

ailment rights of Itolurv International were out-

of cngiiging in aelivilies protcetci! hy the first nmend-

iy t*iilifi»rfiiii*H cotupeMittK slate interest in climi-

men!

icrimitinfioii on the dnsis of sex which might itn-

jtuccs, ami the exercise oT religion.

emnle citizens of tin* stuff* in pursuing a husiness

held npplifali"n of the Minnesota pulilic accommodations

(ion.

statute which proliiliitcd Hie Juycee* from denying fwll

KieJifs Art which prohihifs

HIICII

a

y International mny nol raise tin* •fiifslion of
••• I'niiili Act is oie-oiisfifnf

M»M;IIIV

vague or over

liis Court ns it fnid*i| to timely mist* flu* issue in
court. Rotary lufcrnalional mny not assert Hint
ll A i l

is liueoitstif u l i o n a l l v

not vague lis opplieil 1o if.
tiuconstitiit ioimllv overliroinl.

vague

liecan^e

Ihe

s|ieechv nssemhly. petition for the redress of grievHowever, the court up

iiM*mliershi|i to women heeause the .Inycees was not an
organization which eoiihl assert a eoiistitutioiial right of
intimate association ami Minnesota9!! coiii|»elling interest
in prohibiting discrimination against its female citizens
jusfif'ieil ;m\ impitf*f on the .laycees* freeilom of expressive
assoriaf ion.

K i n ; i l l \ , flit* CliMlh

The decision of the California Court of Appeal helow
is consistent with this Court's decision in Huberts ami
merely involve application of the principles in Hnberls lo
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Constitutional Guarantee! Do Wot Protect
Private Discrimination.
(Htffll the Constitution d w s recognize rights of
IIIKI expressive nssiN'ialioiK these constitutional
es have never IN-CII held In include an affirmative
discriminate.
he contrary, thin Court has held on numerous
I flint private discrimination is unworthy of eonil protection. Thin issue WHS first addressed by
t in llit* conlfxt of discrimination by labor oignniIn Itaitmifi Mnil Jssoriafion r. Cm si, .TJI5 U.S. KS
lis Court upheld I lie application of New York's
o\mcnt law to such an mgnni/iitioii, rejecting tlit*
lliat such discrimination was protected against
crfcrencc liy the fourteenth amendment. This
efusnl to extend constitutional protection to pri-rimitiation continued in Xonroorf r.
Ilnnis»n.
155 (I!t7:t) where this Court affirmed that a slate
loan textbooks to a segregated school, saving:
'I Although the Constitution docs not proscribe
tte bins, it places no value on discrimination as it
on the values inherent in (he Free Fxcreise
<e. Invidious private discrimination may he char
ized as a form of exercising freedom of associa|iroterteil liy the First Amendment, hut it has
• heen accorded affirmative constitutional proms." /</.. at 4fi!l-70.
larly. in l(nn>t»H r. MrCnmt. 427 U.S. IHI. I7<5
lolding that 42 I'.S.C. '. PXI prohibits piivale
'MIII denying admission on the ha-is of race, this
•ted the language cited ahove in Xoiwood #•. Until distinguished hetween the protected Fir? I

!1

Amendment right to advocate segregated SCIMHIIS, ami the
usserteil right to exclude students on the basis of race, rejecting the latter.
This issue was addressed most reeently in If islam r.
Kinti if NiMhlhtfi. 41\7 U.S. K!> TI^Mt), where this Court
upheld the application of Title VII to the partnership
decisions of a law firm, rejecting the claim that regulation
of the firm's employment practices violated constitutional
guarantees. IT any constitutional restriction* applied to
the regulation of relatioiishi|ts which •'touch or concern**
rights of privacy or association, these restriction* would
certainly lie at their |ieak ns to the intimate choice of partners in a law firm. Rotary International has no claim of
an intimate relationship with the more than !Mai#fKHi btcal
cluli members from whom it receives dues payments, ami
thus the Constitution does not protect its desire to discriminate on the basis of sex in memhership.
While n constitutionally protected ••/.one of privacy**
protecting private discrimination hr* lieen discussed by
some members of the Supreme Court tsee IUU r. Mfirjt*
o W . ;i7H U.S. 22t!f :ii:i (I !M»4) (Uohllierg, J., concurring)
and Uonsr l.o,h,r Sn. 7 r. In is. 4117 U.S. 1ltt. 17!' ISO
(l!*7'J) (Douglas, •'•• dissenting)), this projiositioii has
never heen applied by this Court to approve discriminatory practices. Indeed. Ibis Court has consistently refused
to interfere with slate regulation of private discrimination.
tMher slate courts have held that private dubs may
not discriminate in violation id" state public accommodation statutes. Sn\ e.g.. Commonwealth of /'< nnstfli tiHtit.
Human H< lot tons (\wnnissioit
r. homil Onlrr of .1/no.vr,

10

11

otlfir So. tor. 44R Tn. 451 r 294 A.2d 594 (1972). np|n»nl
iHtiiiKKiMl for want of a substantial federal iptcstimi, 4n!»
.S. 10.VJ (1972). in which flu* same Huh discussed in
!iwse Lot!fiv So. 107 r. Inis,

407 U.S. Hill, was held siili-

rct to a Mate r i r i l rights law: H.I'.O.E.
f

Bnnfiwiik

Lmhic So. JiH't

v. fftfirnlrffNi. 297 A.2d 1107, 1114 l\\:% (Me.

972) t appeal dismissed Tor waul of a substantial federal
uestinn, 410 U.S. 9011 (1972). in which the |mwer or a
tate to rcgnlntc discrimination by a private chili was
igain upheld; ami, Note, Sri lino lust ami the
Amendment aflvr
U7 f 759 (1977)

HHHOOH

MrCrani,

I\

( # t 11*1 m u t e

Thirteenth

29 Stan. h. Kev.

clubs ninnot

successfully

The right to associate for expressive purposes
is nol f however, absolute, lufrimremeiits on that riirht
may IN* justified by regulations adopts! to serve
Coui|icHiug state interests, unrelated to tilt* suppression

of if leas, that cannot \n* achieved through means significant Jy less restrictive of associntioiuil freedoms.
W e are |»orsundcd that Minnesota 9 * wm|iel1iiij* interest in eradicating discrimiuafiou against its female
citizens justifies the iui|tact that application or the
statute to the .laycees may have on the male mcmliers f associatinnnl freedoms. |Citations omitted.)
4fW U.S. at IfcEI.

•laim either the right of association or Hit* right to priPublic policy in California strongly favors elimina-

racy-").

tion or discrimination based on sex. Koire
Since assertion* of constitutional protection Tor dis-

Wash, 40 Cal.Hd at MUM.

r. Metro Cor

The Cnruh Act expressly pro-

criminatory membership ami guest |iolicics or truly pri-

hibits sex discrimination by business enterprises and has

vate clubs have been rejected, there is certainly no such

been applied to invalidate policies that tliscriminate on tin1

protection for Hotnrjr

bases i d sex ami public accommodations. Ishi.strr r. Hoys'

International, an association of

clubs which itscir has no human mcmliers.

0. If Any Constitutional Rights are Infringed,
California has a Compelling Interest which
Justifies Such Infringement.

Chib of Saola Croc. lor.. 40 f a l . t d 72 (I9s;i).
As recognized in a landmark decision by the Call for
nia Supreme Court, which led the nation in establishing
thai discrimination on the hn*is of sex is subject to tin

Assuming any constitutional rights are infringed by
a state's prohibition of discriminatory membership prac9

most rigorous scrutiny.

%%

sc\ alone may not be used t<

bar a person from a vocation, profession or business.1

tices, the validity of the state s action can onl\ he deter-

Sail'er

mined after the state's interest is balaueed u*r:iiust the

further stated: • ' | T | h e ri»ht to work ami tin* coiienmilaii

hm. hie. r. Kirln,

(1971) Ti C a l . M I. S. The n.in

nature and decree or the intrusion. As described in An-

oppuituuitx to nchie>e economic seeuritx and stability nr

derson l\ Velelnvzzv. 4• *•• • I'.S. 7*U, 7S!I (lim:',!, the :ni;il\

essential to the |Mirsuit of life, hb«rt\ :r»,| t*:ip|ion«s* **

tical process the court inns! employ is to id<nfd'\. ev;ilu;itc

Cnl.."»d at 17. The court below extended lhi< concern t

anil weigh the countervailiui: interests. As this INnirl eon

include the discriminatory policies of an association wide

eluded in Hohvrls:
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consider a fitlrrnt unestion which was mil presented lo fin*
ntnle courts M o w . MVbfc •». MVffb, 4f>1 U.S. 4!Mf !!•:•
(1!W1): Cardinal*- v. State of Louisiana. IVM U.S. 4.17, I.ts
(1969).

This Court has applied the overhreadth doctrine
••sparingly and only ns a last resort ff to strike down statutes which on their face may chill first amendment rights.
Itmmhirk i\ OUnlmma. 41.1 U.S. WHf ISCI (I!l7:i). This
Court has slated its reluctance to strike down a statute on
its face where it may lie validly applied. Thus, in Parker
•\ l^rtf, 417 U.S. 7.I4. where ap|»cllantvs actions felt within
the ipicstinncd statute, this Court declined to find it overhroad slating:

Notary International never asserted (tint (he t'ttritfi
Act was unconstitutionally vague or ovcrhroad in HIM stair
court*. It did mnkc nn argument lutsed on "uncertainly"
in its |*tttion for rehearing in the California Court of Ap
peal tint linger California law this issue was nol timeU
raised (Itulc 1*1 ( l ) ) ( l ) , California Utiles of Court). This
Court will not hear n ipiestinn that was not timely raised
tinder state Inw. Exxon Corp v. Eaqertmi. AiVl U.S. I7U.
181 n.3 (1983); Itaifrg v. Anderson. Ittfi U.S. SKI, 2l!.V:!ii7.
B. The Unruh Act is Not Vague as Applied to
Rotary International.
l€

Under the void Tor vagueness doctrine lo]ne to
whose conduct a statute eleurly applies may not success
fully challenge it for vagueness." Parker r. Lertf, 417
U.S. 7:W. 75fi I1JI741. The Unruh Art expressly prohibits
discrimination on the hnsis of sex. Notary International
sought to require Dunrtc lo discriminate on (he hnsis of
sex, thus Rotary International cannot claim that the Unruh
Act is %arue as applied to it.
0. The Unruh Act is Not
Overhroad.

Unconstitutionally

Appellants argue that the Unruh Act is unconslitu
tionully ovcrhroad liecniise it has a chilling effect on the
first amemlmeiit nss«»« lutional rights oT all groups in Cali
fornia which are not open In the general puMic. This
Court need not consider this claim.

••. . . Thus even if there are marginal applications in which a statute would infringe on first amend
meiit values, facial invalidation is inappropriate if
the remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range
of easily idcntifinhle and constitutionally pro<crihed
conduct... . " 417 U.S. at 7«l.
California courts have not interpreted the I t
s" as to chill the first amendment rights of intimate a<«eiatiou anil expressive association recognized hy this Court
in Itohertx. Clenrly the Unruh AcCs prohibition or urhi
trary discrimination against define 1 classes of person!
IIIN*S not aim nt suppressing first amemlmeiit rights. Ii
lloherls this Court rejected the suggestion that discrim
iiuiton mcmliership |Nilicies are themselves "sytnlNil'u
Hieeeh" snhject to firs! amendment protection. IHW U.S
at 1527.
In Uoherts the ,ln)cccs nrgm»d that the Mimical!
puMic accommodations statute was uiictinslitntioiiall
\ague and ovcrhroad. t.iUe the CIPUII Act at issue herei
Ho* Minnesota statute ptohit»itcd dUci iniinatimi hy a "l»u*
•ie-s*%. |i;s C.v:. nt i;i.V The Minnesota Supreme Com
concluded that the .ta\coos was a husiness t»ecail<e it sol

and extended privileges in exchange for annual men
hership dues. 4IW U.S. at tilt?. This Court held that 11i
I!«MMU

Hi
Minnesota AH, n* interpreted h\ its highest court, was nol
iincoiis'itutiomilly vague and overbroad Iteeanse "the Minnesota Nupiemc t'otiit used ii numl»cr nl* specific ;titil oh
jeclive rt ifITI;I iciraidin*: the m jxani/af ion's size, sclcetivitv. conmiereinl naluic, and use of public facilities
typicnlU employed in deleiminiii" the applicability oT slate
iififi federal antidiscrimination statutes lo the membership
policies of nssortedly private t-liil»M.•• 4tW | T .S. tV2*X
California court* have applied Just such specific and
objective criteria in dctcrmiiiiiiK flint various orjrnni/ntiona, including Hotary International, arc subject to tin* |lnroll Art's prohibition of arbitrary discrimination. In
Isbi.shr v. Hoys9 Club of Santa Cruz. hn\. 40 Cnl.hl 7 J,
tin* California Supremo Court held that tin* Unrtih
Act prohibited the Boy** Club from discriminating on the
bonis of sex l**cause it provided an atmosphere deemed
characteristic of a public accommodation, and members
laeke.l a sense of "MOC'IHI cohesiveness, shared identity, or
continuity tf . 40 Cal..7d at H1-H2. Similarly, in Cumin r.
Mount Diablo Council of the lloif Smuts. 117 Cnl.App.rM
12 (l9A*!) ( app. clisni., 104 S C I . .T>74 (l!>K4», the court held
hat the Hoy Scouts were subject to the tlnriih Art because
tt like tin* Hoya'CIub, offered its facilities ami membership
o the general |iublic. In addition to fnnisinirnn tin* public
variability of fficnd»crship ami facilities, California courts
ave also hold the Unruli Act to be applicable to nriranixnions with commercial or businesslike attributes. Minimi
*oint, Ltd. v. Wntfsnn, JWI CnL'ld 7:!l tlar-e apart
lent complex) ; O'Cnunor r. I'Maifr (iimi On in is J\.\o#\,
\\ Cal.rtil 7!M>, 7!Ci (I!»K:J) (Condominium owners 9 a.-socioion which |N?rformcd the customary Inactions of a land

ml).
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Thus, it can easily be diseeruetl that the prohibition*
of tin* I'uruh A«| will applv to just the «<»rt of orirani/a
lions described b\ thi* Court in ltnt<if% as not hcini; in
the class of organizations.who«i< ritrhts of intimate and exprossive association are protected by the first amendment
and there is no risk I hat it will lie applied - i t o n «mb*tnntinl amount of protectee I conduct." «W U.S. at Kll. Kven
if it is established that some eluh< not ofien to the jrencral
public are subject to the Curiih Act. it iloes not follow that
every |irivate club will IM\ Those CIUIM which are truly
intimali* and |iersoiinl and which have few or no commercial ntlributes are not subject to the lTiirnli Act nnd nmv
continue to set such uicmliership |wilicic« as they choose.
Those whose major fairpose is expressive activity subject
to first amendment protection may set membership |*dicie« which are rationally related to their expressive activities. Under California court interpretations or the
Unrnh Act, the small group of intimate Friends who gather
to play (inker have no fear that their right to freely and
intimately associate will lie disturltcd by the lonp arm of
the state even if they derive incidental business and professional benefits from their association.

I«

CONCLUSION
For the fnreiroinK reason*, ttir Slalc of Cnlifornin
•jre« tliin Court to grant iip|*ellees f tiiolion In IIIHIIIIMS llio
i|H*al or, in the nlternnttve, to affirm llio ileeisinn helotv.
K O * | N T I r o i l y ntilttttitleil,
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II.

e.

The closer a wife's earnings are to her husband's the more likely she is to delay having
children.

f.

Women who postpone childbirth display a solid attachment to the labor force both
before and after their first child is born.

g

Early marriage is more of a deterrent to women's educational attainment than it is to
men's

h.

As single women are the most likely labor force participants, the fact that more women
•re delaying marriage suggests a higher overall participation rate for women.

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
1.

Utah women have been steadily moving into the workplace since the turn of the century,
and they currently participate in the labor force in record numbers.
a

In 1900. an estimated 13 percent of Utah's adult females worked outside the home

b

By 1940. almost a fourth of Utah women were.labor force participants

c.

In 1984. the Current Population Survey estimates that 54.4 percent of all Utah women
16 years and older were either working or looking for a job.

2

While it may seem that women have flooded into the job market im the last few years,
actually the increase has been relatively steady.

3

Utah's female participation rate registers higher than does the rate for the country as a
whole, in spite of the fact that Utah women initially lagged behind the rest of the American
women.

4

Female rates tend to be understated as the average woman statistically outlives the average
man

5.

Women 20 to 24 show the highest propensity to be labor force participants—their rate
exceeds 70 percent

6

More than half of Utah's married women have moved into the civilian labor force Mothers of
young (preschool) children, while least likely of all categories to work, have joined the work
force at the fastest rate and 45 percent are currently labor force participants

7.

Utah women made up 42 percent of the Utah civilian labor force in 1984 Between the years
of 1950 and 1980 Utah's labor force expanded more than one and one-half times, women
accounted for 62 percent of this growth

6.

The only instance in recent history when women have not sustained higher unemployment
rates occurred in the 1982-83 recession when heavily male dominated industries (such as
mining, construction, heavy manufacturing) experienced the brunt of the economic
malaise

4

TEXT TABLE 10
UTAH AND UNITED STATES
PERCENT OF FEKALE EMPLOYED CIVILIANS
BY OCCUPATION
1984

I
1

1 OCCUPATION

PERCENT OF WORKERS FCMAlF ]
UTAH
us 1

1 TOTAL

42

kk 1

I MANAGERIAL 4 PROFESSIONAL
1
EXLCl'TiVE 4 ADHiMSTRAlUKS
1
PHOFLSMONALS

kO

<•:

1 TECHNICAL, SALES, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE

61
iC
M5
81

1

TLCHMCAL

1

SALFS

1

ADrM.'MkATlvr SUPPuRT

1 SERVICE OCCUPATIONS
1 PRECISION PRODUCTION, CRAFTS 4 REPAIRS

32

lu

*e

Lb

60

9

^

*e
kb

bl 1
1,1 1

*1

1 OPERATORS, FABRICATORS, 4 LABORERS

25

lij

1 FARMING, FORESTRY 4 FISHINC

18

U

\l

*-''
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have eliminated the pay gap entirely Mincer and Polachek accounted for 70 percent of the gap
between married men and women n A review of research relative to the wage gap by the National
Academy of Sciences panel shows that in the studies reviewed, worker characteristics accounted for
§tmost 44 percent of the differential " Duncan and Corcoran report that "less than half of the earnings
gap can be explained by the kinds of differences in job commitment or work qualifications that could
affect the earnings potential of any worker, male or female Most of the gap remains unexplamable and
may indeed reflect some institutionalized discrimination against women in (he working world *>*
Although this research suggests discrimination, the proposition itself is a difficult one to prove
However, the fact remains, that after all measurable variables are included in earnings equations for
women and men. there still remains a variance which is not removed
Although women are moving into the professions, part of the problem lies in the fact that women don't
seem re fce promoted as qukkly as men Even as continuously employed women get older, their
earnings oo not rise as rapidly as men's d a One study came to the cancLision that the major cause of
th£ female earnings deficit could be attributed to the failure of women to rise as fast as men with the
same amount of education in the same occupation n
The Salt Lake Tribune recently reported on an essay prepared by two Smith College economistsSusan Boslego Carter and Michael Carter They entitled their work, "Women's Recent Progress in the
Professions or. Women Get a Ticket to Ride After the Gravy Tram Has Left the Station " The Carters
po»nt out that while in the past a person's first job was a pretty good forecaster of the quality of their
future career, this has not proved to be the case for many women A growing number of economists,
including the Carters, feel that a "two-track" job system is emerging The first track offers good paying
job* with high prestige and an opportunity TUT advancement O M h e other hand, the second track
(jobs in the same occupation) is creating a new class of routine, low-paying jobs, unconnected to
promotion ladders Women seem to be ending up in the second track of these professional jobs For
example about three-fourths of male doctors are "office-based" compared to just overlnatf df female
doctors Physicians in private practice would generally have the highest potential for high incomes A
Similar pattern is occurring in business Many feel that while women are making irroads educationally
and into middle management, their advancement into top management is being stymied v
Myra Strober. director of Stanford's Center for Research on Women, explains that one basic problem
is that male executives tend to choose successors who are like themselves M Women who do succeed
such as Mary Cunningham, are often faced with a subtle form of sexual harassment that attempts to
undermine their credibility by assuming that the only way a woman gets ahead quickly is through
sexual favors
One result of the Duncan and Corcoran study suggests that although men were a little more likely to
have QOtten their jobs through, shall we say the "old bov network.TJITB on acTuai earnings turned UD
little evidence that this road leads to substantially higher pay for either sex However they did find that
men were more likely to obtain positions with longer training periods (which may eventually lead to
higher pay) The researchers also discovered that the earnings of those who merely supervise their
co-workers don't differ ail that much from nonsupervisory personnel However, jobs with authority to
hire. fire, and promote were associated with a 20 percent higher pay rate Only about one in ten
working women compared to one in four working men had authority over the pay and promotion of
others Duncan and Corcoran point out. "In fact many theorists see such hierarchical authority
structures as the means of preserving an existing social or economic structure, often implying the
existence of some form of discrimination or inequity "n

Young unmamed mothers make up a large portion of the poor Although fertility among teenagers is
actually dropping (like the fertility rate m general), pregnant teenagers are less likely to get married or
give their babies up for adoption than before Mothers who married young or not at all are usually
•M-eguipped to find jobs which pay enough to support themselves and their children, particularly m a
aociety that generally pays women less than men
A recent (Ma'Ch 1983) study found that almost one-fourth of U S working women who maintained
families had not completed high school compared to 15 percent of working wives Women with
children under the age of s«* are limited by the high cost of child care and the additional problems
associated with raising children with only one parent The same survey found that the unemployment
rate for mothers with preschoolers was 23 percent compared with 15 percent for mothers whose
youngest child was at least school age * However, women maintaining famihesdoshowa very strong
commitment to the labor force Seventy-five percent of mothers maintaining families whose youngest
child was school age participated m the work force
Other women who face income problems are "displaced homemakers'* divorced deserted or
wiaowec women whose children are over 18 thus making them ineligible for Aid to Families w tn
Dependent Children (AFDC) Many times these women have been out of the labor force and ou* of
school for many years and have few visible marketable job skills Women aged 65 and older also ma*e
up a large share of impoverished females

IN CONCLUSION
Women have averaged m the last three decades only 60 percent of their male counterpart s earnings
Data suggests tna* this pay gap may be even wider for Utah women Although the gap has narrowed
slightly m recent yeafs some economists believe this constriction was an anomaly Regardless of
education experience or occupation women earn less than men Even so they contribute
substantially to their family s income Many reasons have been advanced to account for the wage
differentia'mciudmg differences »n work history educational content occupation manta! patterns
and productivity However no reliable research has been able to account for more than 70 percent of
the gap base:: on these characteristics This fact points to the existence of some sort of
institutionalized discrimination agamst woman but does not prove it The female male wage
differential the fact that many women lack the skills to obtam a good job and the increased numpers
of women who are heads of families without male support has led to increased poverty among women
and the'' chiio'en

